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This thesis examines the relationships between Irish and Basque nationalists and 
nationalisms from 1895 to 1939—a period of rapid, drastic change in both contexts. In the 
Basque Country, 1895 marked the birth of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque 
Nationalist Party), concurrent with the development of the cultural nationalist movement 
known as the ‘Gaelic revival’ in pre-revolutionary Ireland. In 1939, the Spanish Civil War 
ended with the destruction of the Spanish Second Republic, plunging Basque nationalism 
into decades of intense persecution. Conversely, at this same time, Irish nationalist 
aspirations were realized to an unprecedented degree during the ‘republicanization’ of 
the Irish Free State under Irish leader Éamon de Valera.  
Contrary to romantic visions of natural solidarity between these two nationalist 
movements, this research offers a more nuanced account of the relationship. Ireland was 
an important source of inspiration for Basque nationalists throughout this period, 
particularly those of a more radical separatist tendency. However, there were moments 
when the mainstream Basque nationalist movement expressed little sympathy for Irish 
independence. Likewise, Ireland was not always sympathetic to the plight of Basque 
nationalists, particularly during the Spanish Civil War. 
 Through an analysis of primary sources on both sides, ranging from Basque 
nationalist periodicals to Irish diplomatic documents, this thesis pieces together a detailed 
account of Basque-Irish relations during the period in question. The broader picture 
shows numerous contradictions and ironies in the relationship(s) in this period, 
demonstrating the evolving and multi-faceted nature of these nationalisms—the 
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Notes on Language 
 
All text originally in a language other than English has been translated herein. Epigraphs 
appear first in the original language with a translation in the footnotes. Translations are 
my own unless otherwise noted. 
 
This work does not employ Basque language conventions that are no longer standard. 
However, key terms remain in their contemporary dialectal spelling rather than being 
rendered in their modern Standard Basque spelling. 
 
I have used nativized English names for places when possible (hence Biscay instead of 
Bizkaia/Vizcaya). Otherwise, I have endeavoured to use the currently-accepted official 
spellings for Basque toponyms rather than their Castilian equivalents, when such is the 
case (hence Gipuzkoa instead of Guipúzcoa, etc.). In other cases, I have used only the 
Basque place name for hyphenated Basque-Castilian bilingual place names, for the sake 
of convenience. Irish places are referred to in English, and I have not used Gaelicized 
names unless the person was usually known by such. Any errors of judgement on these 
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“La solidaridad, cada vez más estrecha, de las gentes y el intercambio, cada día más 
intenso, de ideas y sentimientos, rompen hoy contra todo aislamiento.” 
 
Engracio Aranzadi, 19161 
 
 
In 2018, the armed Basque separatist organization Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA—
Basque Country and Freedom) formally disbanded. Many Basque nationalists hoped to 
imitate the Irish peace process, and even received input from Sinn Féin leader Gerry 
Adams himself over the years.2 Arnaldo Otegi, considered a key figure in ETA’s 
disarmament, has often been referred to as ‘the Basque Gerry Adams’.3 Basque flags 
and murals can still be found in Ireland, and vice versa—products of a solidarity largely 
based in the heydays of the armed struggles of ETA and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 
   
Credit to Peadar Whelan (An Phoblacht) 
                                               
1 “Solidarity between peoples, increasingly strong, and the exchange of ideas and feelings, every day 
more intense, today counters any isolationism,” Kizkitza (pseud. Engracio Aranzadi), “Ante la revolución 
irlandesa,” Euzkadi no. 1204 (May 28, 1916). 
2 Paddy Woodworth, “The Spanish-Basque Peace Process: How to Get Things Wrong,” World Policy 
Journal 24, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 65-73; Gerry Adams, “Adams praises historic advance in Basque peace 
process,” http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/49290. 
3 Jane Walker, “Basque leader Otegi jailed for 15 months,” Irish Times (Apr. 28, 2006). 




Given their relative geographical proximity, it is no surprise that there is a much 
longer history of contact between Ireland and the Basque Country. Since at least the 
twelfth century, there has been a widespread understanding that the two peoples are 
closely linked. In circa 1136, Geoffrey of Monmouth claimed that ancient Ireland was 
“given to be inhabited by the Basclenses, who had been banished out of Spain.”4 This 
account initiated a Basque-Irish mythology which was to have a surprisingly long 
lifespan.5 Only a few decades later, Gerald of Wales wrote in The Conquest of Ireland 
that “the people of Ireland came first out of the Basques and out of Bayonne, which now 
belongs to Gascony, ruled by the English Crown.”6 At that time, English King Henry II was 
married to Eleanor of Aquitaine, whose holding of the Duchy of Aquitaine encompassed 
the northernmost part of predominantly-Basque territory. Gerald of Wales thus claimed 
by an interesting logical deduction that “therefore you might well understand that by 
ancient right and by new, the English Crown rightfully has lordship over Ireland.”7 
A travel account from 1782 by Sir John Talbot Dillon, an Irish nobleman, remarked 
that “[t]he manners of the Biscayners, and the ancient Irish, are so similar on many 
occasions, as to encourage the notion of the Irish being descended from them […] So 
many concurring circumstances support the idea of their having been originally one 
                                               
4 Geoffrey of Monmouth, History of the Kings of Britain, trans. Aaron Thompson, ed. J. A. Giles 
(Cambridge [Ontario]: In Parentheses Publications, 1999), 47; This edition perpetuates the typographical 
error of calling them Barclenses, which historically has been used as proof of a Semitic origin of the Irish, 
bar- being a Semitic patronymic prefix (see Laurence Waddell, The Phoenician Origin of Britons, Scots 
and Anglo-Saxons, 1924). However, Barclenses was merely a typo in an early reproduction of the 
manuscript which seems to have been copied for centuries, while the older manuscript (MS. Red. 13 D. 
ii.) still reads Basclenses. See the notes of editor Frederic Madden in Layamon’s Brut, Vol. 3 (London: 
Society of Antiquaries of London, 1847), 328. 
5 Julio-César Santoyo, Irlandeses y vascos: Evolución histórica de una leyenda (Bilbao: Durango Zugaza, 
1979), 46.  
6 I have taken the liberty of providing a more modern English rendition of the fairly archaic text in a 15th-
century edition (circa 1440 by Rawlinson) reproduced in The English Conquest of Ireland, A.D. 1166-
1185, Mainly From the ‘Expugnatio Hibernica’ of Giraldus Cambrensis, edited by Frederick J. Furnivall 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1896), 137; To set the translation record straight, this 
version reads: “On othyr halue, the Pepil of Irlande come fryste out of Bascles and out of Bayon, that 
longyth now to gascoyne, Whereof the kynges of Englande ben lordys.” The original Latin reads: 
“Praeterea urbs Baonensis, quam hodie nostra continet Gasconia, Blasconiae caput est, unde 
Hibernenses provenerant,” which might be translated as “Furthermore, the Irish came from the city of 
Bayonne, the capital of Blasconia [the Basque Country], which today our Gascony contains.” Notably the 
original Latin version is less explicit about the Irish actually being Basque than is its fifteenth-century 
translation. 
7 Ibid; “And thus ye may wel vndyrstonde that, both by olde ryght and by new, the kynges of England 




people.”8 In the 1837 work The Basque Provinces, news correspondent and author 
Edward Bell Stephens remarked: 
The Biscayans are indeed a highly intelligent, sociable, and amiable people. 
They possess all the natural active politeness of the Irish peasantry, without 
any alloy of servility [...] They differ however so much in one material respect 
from the Irish, that I can scarcely believe the latter have any fair claim to a 
common origin, [...] viz. Their remarkable sobriety, notwithstanding the 
abundance of wine and aguardiente in the country.9 
 
Overall, there seems to have been a fairly common understanding of an ancient 
relationship between the two peoples. Irish racial and linguistic studies throughout the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century made frequent reference to a Basque origin of the 
Irish. One philologist noted that “there are diversities in the physical aspect of the Irish 
population; and it is well worthy of inquiry how far any portion conform with the type of the 
neighbouring Basque.”10 Another account of pre-historic Ireland from 1902 claimed that 
“[t]he Irish are a mixed race, the Basque and the Celt went to their formation. The original 
inhabitants of the country were Basque, but successive Celtic invasions obliterated the 
ancient Basque language, and altered the physical appearance of the people.”11  
 The relationship between Ireland and the Basque Country was to assume a new 
character with the rise of modern nationalism. The so-called ‘long gestation’ of 
revolutionary Irish nationalism began in the 1890s, gradually supplanting the mostly 
constitutional nationalist Home Rule movement. Historian Roy Foster remarks that this 
was “a generation bent on self-transformation,” and marked by “a sense of deep 
differentiation from their parents’ generation.”12 Indeed, 1916 Easter Rising leader 
Pádraic Pearse once declared: “There has been nothing more terrible in Irish history than 
the failure of the last generation.”13  
                                               
8 John Talbot Dillon, Travels through Spain (London: R. Baldwin, 1782), 167-168; Emphasis mine. 
9 Edward Bell Stephens, The Basque Provinces (London: Whittaker & Co., 1837), 151-152; Emphasis 
mine. 
10 Hyde Clarke, “On the Pre-Celtic Epoch in Ireland,” Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy (1836-
1869) 10 (1866-1869): 102. 
11 “A History of Ireland,” All Ireland Review 3, no. 43 (Dec. 27, 1902): 704. 
12 R. F. Foster, Vivid Faces: The Revolutionary Generation in Ireland, 1890-1923 (London: Penguin, 
2015), 11. 




The Basque Country was similar in this regard. Basque nationalism was a turn 
away from (and an offshoot of) Carlism, a traditionalist political movement that sought the 
installment of a more conservative royal line which would reinstate the fueros—historical 
chartered rights which granted a range of social and economic privileges to the Basques 
and allowed the Basque provinces to govern themselves under their own laws. The fueros 
fell to Spain’s nineteenth-century liberal project of centralization after a series of civil wars 
(the Carlist Wars). While Basque Carlists desired a return to the political autonomy they 
enjoyed prior to the Convention of Vergara (Bergara), which ended the First Carlist War 
(1833-1839), a young student named Sabino Arana came to a new realization in 1882. 
According to Arana, their homeland was neither “theoretically nor juridically considered a 
part or region of the Spanish nation, but a veritable nation of its own, currently dominated” 
by Spain.14 It was not a question of re-obtaining privileges from the Spanish Crown, but 
of reasserting their intrinsic nationhood. In 1897, the still-fringe group of Basque 
nationalists sent a telegram to the Lord Mayor of Dublin which read: “Basque people 
lament like Ireland loss of their liberty. Therefore congregated to-day under holy oak of 
Guernica, in remberance [sic] better times and to acquire strength to see them return. We 
send hearty salute through you to noble and courageous people of Ireland.”15 
These two nationalisms, guided by many of the same transnational cultural 
undercurrents, were to become increasingly entangled in the following decades. As 
Ireland experienced a quashed uprising, a war against the British, partition of the island, 
and then a civil war, ultimately forming a self-governing dominion, Basque nationalists, 
particularly those of the most radical factions, took an increasing interest in the Irish 
example. At times they saw parallels between Basque and Irish history—two nations, 
according to their nationalist narratives, which saw their freedoms eroded by an 
imperialist neighbour against whom they had a long history of struggle. Apparent historical 
parallels readily became contemporary comparisons, which by extension raised the 
question of whether the ‘Irish model’ was appropriate for the Basque nationalist cause. 
However, it was not until the Spanish Civil War that Basque nationalists attained 
                                               
14 Bizkaitarra no. 8 (Apr. 22, 1894), in Obras completas de Arana-Goiri’tar Sabin (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Sabindiar-Batza, 1965), 267. 




autonomy (albeit for only a part of the Spanish, or ‘southern’, Basque Country). 
Meanwhile in Ireland, the Spanish Civil War exacerbated political rivalries still tense from 
the Irish Civil War, with two radically different visions of what Ireland ought to be reflected 
on either side of the war in Spain. Both arguments featured a prominent Basque 
dimension that remains underexplored in the historical literature. 
This work examines the relationship between the Irish and Basque nationalist 
movements from 1895 to 1939, that is, from the period of increasingly vigorous Irish 
cultural revival, and the beginnings of Basque nationalism as a socio-political movement 
until the end of the Spanish Civil War and the infancy of the constitutionally-reformed Irish 
state (1937) under Éamon de Valera’s Fianna Fáil government. I take relationship herein 
to mean points of ideological exchange and influence, as well as instances of personal 
interactions and the dynamics thereof. Indeed, historian María Eugenia Cruset defines 
Basque-Irish relations in the 1920s as ‘personal’ in character rather than ‘institutional’, a 
general characterization that I would apply to the entirety of the period considered in this 
thesis.16 Accordingly, this work affords much attention to the individuals and personal 
relationships that linked Ireland and the Basque Country.  
The two nations had much in common. At the turn of the century, they were both 
small sub-state entities, with primarily Catholic populations, and were increasingly 
anxious about the decline of their distinct cultures and languages. Basque and Irish 
nationalist narratives recounted centuries of resistance against Spain and Britain, 
respectively, and both sought a return to an idealized past in which they enjoyed 
unfettered liberty. We will see many commonalities throughout, but this work is not 
primarily concerned with comparing the two as case studies. At times, Basque and Irish 
nationalists themselves drew parallels between the two nations, and these cases certainly 
matter insofar as they reflect their contemporary understanding of each other, and by 
extension, informed their relationship. However, this thesis generally avoids a 
comparative approach per se, opting instead for something more meta-comparative in its 
attention to the comparisons drawn from 1895 to 1939. The central focus of this work is 
on the analysis of the dynamics of the Basque-Irish nationalist relationship and the nature 
                                               
16 María Eugenia Cruset, Nacionalismo y diásporas: Los casos vasco e irlandés en Argentina (1862-




of the networks that connected people from both movements. Such an analysis ties into 
and draws upon several different historiographical streams. 
First, there is a discrete body of Basque-Irish historical literature to which this study 
belongs. While there are a number of Basque-Irish comparative analyses,17 there is also 
a growing body of work on the general ‘Irish influence’ in Basque nationalism. A very brief 
1992 article by José María Lorenzo provides a basic overview of the influence of the 
Easter Rising and the activities of the most pro-Irish Basque nationalists.18 Similarly, that 
same year, Xosé Manoel Núñez authored an article on the mythologization of the Easter 
Rising in the Basque, Catalan, and Galician nationalist movements. Much like Lorenzo, 
his focus is on the reception of the Easter Rising, though wider in scope with its attention 
to Galicia and Catalonia. The Basque-Irish analysis numbers only six pages, concisely 
covering events from 1916 to the Spanish Civil War.19 In his 1996 dissertation on the 
history of Basque political violence, Cameron Watson remarked that the question of Irish 
influence was still “an under-appreciated theme in the historiography.”20 Watson 
dedicates a subsection to the nature of the Irish influence in Basque nationalism, 
suggesting “that the Irish experience allowed for a potential strategy of violence to enter 
the Basque nationalist imagination.”21 A 2002 article by Ander Delgado examines the 
Basque perception of the Irish Home Rule movement, which he describes as having 
strengthened the convictions of those who sought a return to foral (relating to the fueros) 
autonomy.22 Two more notable relevant works appeared in 2017. Núñez returned to the 
                                               
17 See for example John Bew, Martyn Frampton, and Iñigo Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists: Making 
Peace in Ireland and the Basque Country (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Andre Lecours, 
Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2007); Cynthia Irvin, 
Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
18 José María Lorenzo Espinosa, “La influencia del nacionalismo irlandés en el nacionalismo vasco, 
1916-1936,” in Nuevas formulaciones culturales: Euskal Herria y Europa, 239-247 (San Sebastián: Eusko 
Ikaskuntza, 1992). 
19 Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, “El mito del nacionalismo irlandés y su influencia en los nacionalismos 
gallego, vasco y catalán (1880-1936),” Spagna Contemporanea, no. 2 (1992): 25-58. 
20 Cameron Watson, “Sacred Earth, Symbolic Blood: A Cultural History of Basque Political Violence from 
Arana to ETA” (PhD diss., University of Nevada, Reno, 1996), 303. 
21 Ibid., 334. 
22 Ander Delgado Cendagortagalarza, “El fuerismo, el Home Rule Bill y la política británica: el contexto 





Basque-Irish relationship in a much-expanded article covering the years 1890 to 1939.23 
Furthermore, the fiftieth anniversary of the Bombing of Gernika was commemorated in 
Ireland with the publication of a collection of short essays on Basque-Irish topics.24 Two 
relevant doctoral dissertations are forthcoming: “Gora Rebeldiak! The Basque Izquierda 
Abertzale - Irish Republican Movement Nexus, 1959 - 2011” by Niall Cullen and “El 
nacionalismo vasco y su correlato irlandés (1902-1932)” by Iñaki Vásquez. 
Considering the Irish side of the equation presents a major difficulty. There is a 
fundamental disequilibrium in the Basque-Irish relationship in the sense that the Basques 
paid far more attention to the Irish than vice versa. While the founder of the Sinn Féin 
(Ourselves) movement, Arthur Griffith, found an example to follow in Hungary,25 the Irish 
overall paid virtually no attention to the Basque nationalist movement until the Spanish 
Civil War.26 This examination therefore assumes a largely episodic character, as it is 
necessary to focus on the few encounters of Basque and Irish nationalists.  
Another means of approaching the Irish side of Basque-Irish affairs is through an 
analysis of Irish foreign policy as it relates to the Basques. Irish foreign policy is a 
flourishing field of study, and while Ireland’s neutrality during the Second World War is 
frequently the centre of attention, there have been recent commendable efforts to explore 
the pre-1939 period. I have made use of Dermot Keogh’s canonical Ireland and Europe, 
1919-1948 and Gerard Keown’s First of the Small Nations. Beyond these there is the 
Royal Irish Academy’s ongoing Documents on Irish Foreign Policy project accessible 
online, and I have also drawn on consular and diplomatic archival sources for a detailed 
look at the Basque-Irish relationship from an Irish institutional perspective. 
As a work that focuses on personal relationships and personalities, this thesis 
employs several biographical works. On the Irish side, Fearghal McGarry’s work on Eoin 
O’Duffy,27 and McGarry and Seán Cronin’s respective biographies of Frank Ryan are 
                                               
23 Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, “Ecos de pascua, mitos rebeldes: El nacionalismo vasco e Irlanda (1890-
1939),” Historia Contemporánea 55 (2017): 447-482. 
24 Gernika Then and Now: 80 years of Basque-Irish anti-fascist struggles, ed. Gernika 80 Committee 
(Dublin: Gernika 80 Committee, 2017). 
25 See Arthur Griffith, The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland, 1904; Furthermore, see David 
Haglund and Umut Korkut, “Going Against the Flow: Sinn Féin’s Unusual Hungarian Roots” The 
International History Review 37, no. 1 (2015): 41-58, for a study with a serious focus on transnationalism 
or ‘policy transfer’. 
26 Cruset, Nacionalismo y diásporas, 204. 




particularly relevant.28 On the Basque side, José María Lorenzo’s work on Eli Gallastegi 
served as a key source of information on this figure who brought Ireland and the Basque 
Country much closer together.29 Historians of Basque-Irish relations are sorely lacking 
information on one crucial link between the two nations in the early-twentieth century—
Ambrose Victor Martin. To remedy this gap in the academic literature, I have drawn upon 
unreleased documentation in the private possession of the Martin family, generously 
shared to the great benefit of this research. 
Furthermore, this research can be taken as a case study in transnationalism. In 
1993, Daniele Conversi briefly analyzed the impact of the 1916 Easter Rising on Basque 
nationalism within a theoretical examination of the so-called ‘domino effect’ that 
‘successful nationalisms’ exert internationally. He explains that “a supposed domino effect 
can only have an impact if some specific internal factors are present. Examples of 
liberation movements worldwide merely serve to reinforce already pre-existing trends and 
do not bear immediate consequences on the likelihood of secession in faraway states.”30 
As we will see, this understanding holds true for the examples surveyed herein. The 
internal dynamics of Basque or Irish nationalism must take precedence in the 
consideration of a potential external influence. This is especially salient in episodes such 
as reception of the Easter Rising amongst the Basque nationalist community, or the 
impact of the Spanish Civil War on domestic Irish politics. 
At the same time, the historical study of nationalism lends itself to the danger of 
isolated analysis. The ideological features of a given nationalist movement are sometimes 
treated as wholly native developments which can be understood within the confines of 
borders. This has been a preoccupation of scholars for some years now—reflected in the 
so-called ‘transnational turn’ in the academy—and while this thesis does not pretend to 
break any theoretical ground, the exposition that follows could be situated within a broad 
                                               
28 Fearghal McGarry, Frank Ryan (Dublin: UCD Press, 2010); Seán Cronin, Frank Ryan: The Search for 
the Republic (Dublin: Repsol, 1980). 
29 José María Lorenzo Espinosa, Gudari, una pasión útil: Vida y obra de Eli Gallastegi (1892-1974) 
(Tafalla: Txalaparta, 1992); Readers may also be interested in biographies on other important figures 
within this work, including Éamon de Valera, Peadar O’Donnell, and Sabino Arana. See Ronan Fanning, 
Éamon de Valera: A Will to Power (London: Faber & Faber, 2016), Donal Ó Drisceoil, Peadar O’Donnell 
(Cork: Cork University Press, 2001), and Elías Amézaga, Biograf�a sentimental de Sabino Arana (Tafalla: 
Txalaparta, 2003). 
30 Daniele Conversi, “Domino effect or internal developments? The influences of international events and 




body of historical writing that effectively internationalizes nationalism. Both Basque and 
Irish historians have become increasingly aware of the value of transnational contexts in 
the analysis of nationalist movements. That there is a growing body of work on the Irish 
influence in Basque nationalism speaks to this attention. Several historians have similarly 
adopted a transnational approach to Irish nationalism in recent years.31 The research 
presented herein will highlight multiple examples of how a nationalist movement can be 
affected by external forces, and how the reception of such forces can be shaped by the 
characteristics and internal dynamics of the nationalism in question. 
Overall, this work aims to provide an overview of the Basque-Irish nationalist 
relationship from 1895 to 1939 and explain its characteristics, with attention to its evolving 
and multi-faceted nature. In Chapter One I analyze the ideology of the Basque nationalist 
movement prior to 1916 with a focus on its anglophilia (which necessarily complicated 
Basque sympathy for Ireland) and the factionalism that beset it, contextualizing the mixed 
response to the 1916 Easter Rising later on. Chapter Two looks at the Basque nationalist 
reaction(s) to the Easter Rising, the activities of a radical pro-Irish faction, and early 
Basque-Irish contacts on both a personal, informal level and on an institutional level after 
the government of the revolutionary Irish Republic began to propagandize in Spain in 
1919. Chapter Three explores the Basque nationalist coverage of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 
the Irish Civil War, and ongoing Basque-Irish contacts during the early years of the Irish 
Free State and in the midst of a repressive dictatorship in Spain. Chapter Four covers the 
years from 1930 to 1936, as Basque nationalists emerged from clandestinity with the 
advent of the Spanish Second Republic, and similarly, as many Irish republicans were 
rehabilitated with the victory of anti-Treaty leader Éamon de Valera’s Fianna Fáil party. 
The period covered in this chapter offers a wealth of Basque-Irish contacts to discuss, as 
well as potent examples of how Irish nationalism reverberated in radical Basque 
nationalism. Finally, Chapter Five examines the Spanish Civil War as it was experienced 
                                               
31 Niall Whelehan, The Dynamiters: Irish Nationalism and Political Violence in the Wider World, 1867-
1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Róisín Healy, “Irish-Polish Solidarity: Irish 
Responses to the January Uprising of 1863-4 in Congress Poland” in Transnational Perspectives in 
Modern Irish History: Beyond the Island, edited by Niall Whelehan (London: Routledge, 2015), 149-164; 
Fearghal McGarry, “’A Land Beyond the Wave’: Transnational Perspectives on Easter 1916” in 
Transnational Perspectives in Modern Irish History, 165-188; Maurice Walsh, Bitter Freedom: Ireland in a 




in the Basque Country, and how the conflict as a whole became embroiled in Irish politics. 
There was a strong Basque dimension to the reception of the Spanish Civil War in Ireland, 
and I argue that a Basque civil war became entangled with the unsettled legacy of the 
Irish Civil War. 
 The following general points can be made about the relationship between the 
Basque and Irish nationalist movements from 1895 to 1939: First, the most fruitful 
contacts between Basque and Irish nationalists were those of a personal and ‘unofficial’ 
variety. While we will see that there was some indirect relationship between the 
leadership of Sinn Féin (and later Fianna Fáil) and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV—
Basque Nationalist Party), it was generally unproductive and limited to hollow rhetoric of 
solidarity. Second, relations were often the product of pragmatism or convenience rather 
than ideological affinity; the respective factions in contact were not always analogous. 
Third, the internal dynamics of Basque and Irish nationalism were sometimes prejudicial 
to mutual sympathy and solidarity. The notion that Basque and Irish history, and their 
respective nationalist movements, are ‘parallel’ is above all constructed, and they were 



























Ireland and Basque Nationalism, 1895-1916 
 
 
“Los «fenianos» no son otra cosa que la fracción más avanzada de la tendencia 
revolucionaria del Nacionalismo irlandés: los terroristas del nacionalismo.” 
 
Luis Eleizalde, 191432 
 
The Characteristics of Early Basque Nationalism 
 
The Basque province of Biscay experienced industrialization at a disorientating pace 
following the Second Carlist War (1873-1876).33 The defeat of the Carlist insurgents 
spelled an end for the fueros and “home-rule institutions” across the Spanish Basque 
Country.34 The city of Bilbao and the surrounding area was the main stage for liberal 
economic development, based primarily on the burgeoning iron industry. A massive influx 
of immigrants was needed to power the industrial engine of Biscay, effectively tripling the 
population of Bilbao in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The middle class 
suffered as a result of the drastic social and economic transformation, small businesses 
went bankrupt, and independent labourers were absorbed by the gargantuan 
proletariat.35 The retreat of Basque language and traditional culture was accelerated by 
industrialization in Biscay, causing an acute preoccupation amongst a small number of 
Basque regionalists. 
Amidst these rapid changes, seventeen-year-old Sabino Arana began to 
independently study the history of his native Biscay, encouraged by his older brother who 
had planted the idea in his mind that Carlism—a reactionary monarchist movement with 
strong roots in the Basque Country—was counterproductive and that the Basque people 
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were in fact not Spanish at all.36 Arana continued to study and write, which culminated in 
the 1892 book Bizkaia por su independencia (Biscay Through Its Independence), the 
publication of which could be said to mark the beginning of Basque nationalism as a socio-
political movement.37 There are several points to clarify regarding the content of this 
nascent ideology. At this point, Arana’s program sought foremost the independence of 
the province of Biscay, with no pretension to representing the six other provinces 
comprising the Greater Basque Country (a term for which he developed a neologism—
‘Euzkadi’).38 Biscay, a nation by its own right, was to join in a confederation with the other 
Basque provinces, “fraternal peoples by natural ties of race, language, character and 
customs.”39 When Arana founded the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV—Basque 
Nationalist Party) in 1895,40 its programme made clear that the Basque confederation 
was to be on a voluntary basis, and that each province would “retain their traditional 
absolute independence.”41 By 1897, Arana’s movement had shifted from Biscayan to 
Basque nationalism,42 though its Biscayan character was still apparent.43 
 Second, while competence in the Basque language was important (though Arana 
himself was not a native speaker), primacy was afforded to ethnic background in Arana’s 
conception of ‘Basqueness’. In a statement also demonstrating his aversion to Basque-
Catalan comparisons, he wrote:  
The Catalans would like not only themselves to speak Catalan but all the 
other Spaniards established in their region as well; for us it would be our 
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ruin if all the maketos44 resident in our territory spoke Euskera. Why? 
Because the purity of race is, like language, one of the fundamentals of the 
Biscayan banner, while language, as long as there is a good grammar and 
dictionary, can be restored even if nobody speaks it; race, on the other 
hand, cannot be revived once lost.”45  
 
Spanish immigration and inter-mixing with Basques was the root cause of the spiritual 
and moral degeneration of Biscay, according to Arana, who encouraged a passive 
hostility towards foreigners: “The Biscayans are just as obligated to speak their national 
language as they are to not teach it to the maketos or Spaniards. It is not the speaking of 
this or that language, but the difference of language, that is the great means of preserving 
ourselves from the contagion of the Spaniards and avoiding the mixing of the two races.”46 
“If some Spaniard were, for example, drowning in the estuary, screaming for help, answer: 
Nik estakit erderaz [I don’t speak Spanish].”47 However, William Douglass rightfully 
observes that there was nothing exceptional about Sabino Arana’s racism, remarking that 
in the era of European scientific racism, the notion of a Basque ‘race’ was “a creation 
more of the intellectual circles of Paris and Stockholm than Basque (or Spanish) ones.”48 
 Third, the profound religiosity of the PNV was reflected in its official motto—
Jaungoikua eta lagi-zarra (God and the Old Laws), inspired by the Carlist motto Dios, rey, 
patria y fueros (God, king, country, and fueros). The centrality of the Catholic component 
in the movement cannot be understated. The first programme of the PNV clarified that 
Jaungoikua, God, had precedence over lagi-zarra, the Old Laws.49 The state was to be 
guided completely by the Church. Arana’s articulation of Basque nationalism was 
“radically theocratic,” as described by Stanley Payne, and profoundly inspired by the 
Society of Jesus (founded by Basque priest Ignatius Loyola), according to Antonio 
                                               
44 An Aranist neologism and derogatory term for Spaniard. 
45 Sabino Arana, “Errores Catalanistas” Bizkaitarra (Oct. 31, 1894), in Obras completas de Arana-Goiri’tar 
Sabin, 404. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Sabino Arana, “Naskaldija. Fruto,” Bizkaitarra no. 29 (Jun. 30, 1895), quoted in Corcuera Atienza, The 
Origins, Ideology, and Organization of Basque Nationalism, 221. 
48 William A. Douglass, “Sabino’s Sin: Racism and the Founding of Basque Nationalism,” in 
Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism, ed. Daniele 
Conversi (London: Routledge, 2002), 102. 




Elorza.50 The Jesuit influence, claims Elorza, imbued Aranist nationalist discourse with a 
certain militantism.51  
For the first few years after its foundation in 1895, the PNV grew at a 
disappointingly slow rate. It struggled to spread its influence outside of Biscay, and the 
government suppressed the party by banning its publications, arresting several members 
for ‘rebellion’ (including Arana), and criminalizing the posting of the ikurriña, the flag 
designed by Sabino and his brother Luis.52 However, an influx of members in 1898 
invigorated the small group, who ran candidates in the Bilbao municipal election in the 
following year and won five seats of a total thirty-five.53 
 A lesser component—but relevant here—of Basque nationalism at this point was 
its strong anglophilic tendency. In 1902 Sabino Arana wrote shortly before his death: “Our 
victory appears to me certain and close: The independence of the Basque Country, under 
the protection of England, will be a happy fact in the not-too-distant future.”54 Interestingly, 
he was not the first to articulate this idea. In 1756, Basque Jesuit Manuel Larramendi 
described in his utopian (proto-)nationalist work Sobre los fueros de Guipúzcoa a fictional 
scenario in which a delegation from London is sent to the Basques to offer protection in 
their war of independence against Spain and France. The envoy offered military 
protection and equal treatment for Basques under British law.55 Arana did not know of 
this work, but it demonstrates that Britain, seen as Spain’s eternal enemy, quite naturally 
represented an ‘enemy of my enemy’ for Basque nationalists. 
 The Boer War (1899-1902) served to bring this anglophilia to the fore of Basque 
nationalist discourse. The first issue of the PNV press organ, Euzkadi reported on the 
conflict in March 1901. Arana wrote that while the people of Europe were in favour of the 
Boers, he was resolutely in favour of Britain. “Have the Boers,” he asked, “respected the 
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negros like they want to be respected by the English?”56 “They’re in it for pure 
transvaalism, or more precisely, for anglophobic fury: for hate of the English, not for love 
of Transvaal.”57 Another author chimed in: “Us Basques today have no reason to fear nor 
hate England. On the contrary, England is the constant and traditional enemy of the Latin 
race, our enemy.”58  
A recurring theme in Basque nationalist discourse was to compare English rule 
favourably to Spanish rule. Arana asked whether anyone had ever considered that “the 
occupation of Transvaal by the English is less unjust and odious for the Boers than 
Spanish domination is for those who suffer it.”59 The ‘enemy of my enemy’ logic employed 
by Basque nationalists was also familiar to their Irish counterparts. In Ireland, the Anglo-
Boer conflict provided a literal battleground for militant republicans to fight the English. 
Arthur Griffith, the future founder of Sinn Féin (Ourselves), was a central figure in the Irish 
Transvaal Committee, which sent about 300 volunteers in the so-called Irish Brigade to 
South Africa to support the Boer forces.60 By the war’s end in 1902 most of the Irish 
volunteers were either on the run or dead. Arana responded happily to British victory, 
writing a telegram to the British Prime Minister: “Basque Nationalist Party congratulates 
British Majesty for ending South African war, wishing that these people find advantages 
under the gentle yoke of Great Britain.”61 Such sentiment seems contrary to Arana’s own 
anti-imperialism, but, like later Basque nationalists, he may not have even considered 
Britain to be imperialist (rather, its empire was better considered a ‘confederation’).62 
 In the Irish and British context, Sabino Arana saw the Irish Home Rule movement 
as proof of the virtue and tolerance of Great Britain, or at least of British liberalism. The 
Home Rule movement sought the (re-)establishment of a devolved Irish parliament, still 
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linked to the United Kingdom. The centuries-old Irish parliament had been dissolved in 
1801, following the Acts of Union in 1800.63 While Irish Catholic public opinion was 
generally not opposed to the Union at the time—seeing a better opportunity to pursue 
Catholic Emancipation in a united parliament—there had been a strong pressure to 
restore the Irish parliament since the beginning of the ‘Repeal of the Union’ campaign in 
the 1830s.64 In 1886, while Sabino Arana’s ideas about Basque nationalism were at an 
embryonic stage, the First Home Rule Bill introduced by Liberal British Prime Minister 
William Gladstone was defeated in the House of Commons. To make matters worse, the 
campaign for Home Rule was further damaged by a public scandal surrounding the 
adulterous relationship of Charles Stewart Parnell, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary 
Party, and his death shortly thereafter in 1891.65 
While remaining a staunch anglophile, Arana nonetheless supported Irish Home 
Rule. In 1894, following the defeat of the Second Home Rule Bill in the House of Lords, 
Arana called the pro-Home Rule William Gladstone, an “illustrious defender of the rights 
of Ireland.”66 One weekly paper of nationalist inclinations published an article in 1897 that 
compared the Basque Country and Ireland: “The history of Ireland presents many points 
of similarity with the history of the Basque Country. In other times, both lived in happiness 
under their own laws, which both lost due to expansionist and assimilationist politics, and 
ever since then their misfortunes have been increasing.”67 However, the article noted 
some lamentable differences—the Basques had no Irish Parliamentary Party or Charles 
Stewart Parnell of their own. “In the Basque Country the exact opposite takes place; no 
unity, no firmness of ideas; its deputies so complacent with the leaders of Spanish parties 
that they become agents of official business with no care for the aspirations of their 
country.”68 
Sabino Arana wrote a scathing response to the article, evidently seeing more in 
common between Basque and Irish nationalism: 
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The only similarity left out, and which is undoubtedly the most important, is 
that the Irish party calls itself nationalist and aspires to make Ireland 
independent, and there exists here [in the Basque Country] a party also 
calling itself nationalist with identical aspirations. This paper then says that 
in Ireland there exists a union of wills, contrary to what is happening in the 
Basque Country. Fraudsters!! Do your heads not hang with shame? Here 
there is a party with the same name and same aims as the Irish patriots.69 
 
 The notion that Ireland was an example to be followed was articulated repeatedly 
in Basque nationalism in the years to come. In 1895, in the context of the slow gestation 
of the Basque nationalist movement, an article described “the apathy which one notes 
currently amongst the youth of Biscay for all things noble and elevated,” in contrast to “all 
other oppressed peoples, [where] the youth are always the most exalted and decisive 
patriots: amongst the Polish, the Czechs, the Romanians, the Irish…everywhere. 
Everywhere except here in Biscay and the whole Basque Country.”70  
 However, attention to events in Ireland at this point was infrequent, and sympathy 
with the Irish cause passed first through the filter of anglophilia. For example, leading up 
to the coronation of Edward VII in 1902, Irish nationalist pamphlets were disseminated 
throughout Liverpool amongst the Irish diaspora calling for a boycott of royal celebrations, 
reminding them of the 1798 Rebellion, the Penal Laws, and the Famine. One Basque 
nationalist periodical responded in an article titled “Liberty in England”: “A most telling 
testimony of the ample liberty that Great Britain’s present state of law grants to its citizens 
[...] How many good things Spain could learn!”71 Ignoring the content of the propaganda, 
they used the opportunity to praise Britain for permitting the distribution of the pamphlets. 
This rhetoric continued for decades and is an unignorable dimension of the Basque 
perspective of Ireland. Indeed, one of the figures praising the British during the Boer War, 
Luis Eleizalde, bitterly condemned the Easter Rising fifteen years later. 
 England, or Great Britain generally, was to remain in the minds of many Basque 
nationalists a paragon of virtuous governance, much as Basque proto-nationalist Manuel 
Larramendi had believed in 1756. Around the turn of the twentieth century, support for 
the aspirations of Irish constitutional nationalists seemed compatible with an appreciation 
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for the British state. We do not see, for example, simultaneous praise for Great Britain 
and Fenian dynamiters. Nonetheless, there is a stark irony in the parallel support for 
further Irish autonomy and Sabino Arana’s vague idea—albeit of unknown popularity—of 
British Protectorate status for the Basque Country. In this period, the Basque nationalists’ 
grasp of Irish history seems limited, and more serious study may have complicated their 
idea of ‘the gentle yoke of Great Britain’, a term surely not used by many Irish nationalists. 
 Sabino Arana died in 1903 from Addison’s disease. Toward the end of his life, 
Arana came to the conclusion that for progress to be made, the Basque nationalist 
movement would need to compromise by seeking autonomy within the Spanish state, 
instead of outright independence. The dying king split his realm in two, causing a rift 
between those who supported the shift to autonomism and the doctrinal purists who 
convinced themselves that Arana was either compelled in prison, while deliriously ill, to 
renounce separatism, or that it was a clever ruse to avoid prosecution.72 Historian 
Cameron Watson notes that the shift was probably inspired by the more pragmatic 
Catalan nationalists who founded the Lliga Regionalista (Regionalist League) in 1901.73 
Those who supported working within the Spanish political apparatus would later cite the 
Irish example of Daniel O’Connell working within the British Parliament as justification.74 
Factionalism in the Basque Nationalist Movement and Attention to Ireland 
 
While the moderate autonomists exercised more control over the party, the hardline 
independentists remained a force to be reckoned with. Sabino Arana’s brother Luis 
remained a key figure in the movement and refused to accept the policy change; Sabino’s 
chosen successor as party leader, Angel Zabala, likewise did not embrace autonomism. 
The most radical tendencies of the movement, however, were concentrated in the youth 
sectors. Already by 1904, the members of the Sociedad de Juventud Vasca (Society of 
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Basque Youth) numbered some 400.75 The party as a whole continued to grow but 
remained divided between two broad tendencies. All the while, references to Ireland 
continued in Basque nationalist discourse. 
The official press organ of the PNV from 1906 to 1908 was Aberri (Fatherland), 
which loosely represented the orthodox tendency. Euskalduna, not officially linked to the 
PNV but closely tied to its moderate base, supported the compromise of autonomy.76 Only 
one article in Aberri, a weekly publication, discussed Ireland, vaguely calling on Basque 
nationalists to emulate the heroism of Daniel O’Connell.77 Conversely, reportage on the 
exploits of Polish nationalists was fairly common during these same years.78 Ireland had 
evidently yet to eclipse other nationalities in terms of press coverage or interest amongst 
the Basque nationalists of Aberri. 
Euskalduna, on the other hand, referenced Ireland several times during this 
decade. In a 1903 article, they discussed Hungary, Poland, Norway, and Ireland as 
potential ‘examples’. Regarding the Irish, the article read: “Ireland fights bravely against 
the British state, [but] as long as they enact the revolutionary principles of that terrible 
fenianism they will accomplish nothing [...] With Redmond [Ireland] moves toward this 
liberty, coming to see the attainment of Home Rule in the not-distant future.”79 In an article 
titled “Parallel,” they compared the Acts of Union in 1800 to the loss of the fueros in 
1839.80 This camp was firmly in favour of Irish constitutional nationalism, though saw its 
applicability in the Basque Country as limited due to major contextual differences—“there 
they live under a regime of sensible liberty, there the law prevails, and here we live under 
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an oppressive regime, and law is written to serve as an instrument of the whim of whoever 
applies it.”81 
In the last analysis, treatment of Ireland in this decade was infrequent, less 
prominent than other ‘examples’, and not outstanding in tone. Practical lessons to be 
derived from contemporary Irish nationalism seemed limited, so the Basque nationalist 
press emphasized more generically the spiritual struggle and ardent patriotism of 
historical figures in the pantheon of Irish patriots. Cruset says of this period: “In the stage 
after Arana’s death, it was the most radical sectors of the party that delved into the 
example of Ireland.”82 This would be true somewhat later, though in at least the first few 
years after 1903, the evidence suggests that it was actually the less radical sector of the 
party that paid more attention to Ireland. On a general level, historian Xosé Manoel 
Núñez’s analysis of Basque attention to Ireland in this early period is fair: it was “sporadic,” 
and “from a prism of generic solidarity, for Ireland being an oppressed nationality and 
mostly Catholic.”83 
Meanwhile, youthful radicalism and discontent with the status quo festered. In July 
1907, a PNV commemoration at the tomb of Sabino Arana in Sukarrieta, the first of many 
organized by the orthodox nationalists, was later recalled as one of the most important 
days in the life of Elias (Eli) Gallastegi, then only 14 years old, who would soon become 
a principal figure in radical Basque nationalism, as we will see throughout this work. 
Gallastegi subsequently joined Euzko Gaztedija (Basque Youth), which was closely tied 
to the creation of Mendigoxale Bazkuna (Mountaineers’ Assembly), the confederation and 
formal political integration into the PNV of previously informal and separate 
mountaineering youth groups, in 1908.84 The mendigoxales, or mountaineers, possessed 
a militant zeal, and guarded Aranist orthodoxy; their rural retreats were later to become 
veritable paramilitary training exercises, though at this point they were primarily symbolic 
in their rejection of ‘urban sin’ and romantic search for the authentic Basque soul in the 
countryside.85  
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In 1913, the PNV unofficially renamed itself Comunión Nacionalista Vasca (CNV—
Basque Nationalist Communion) in an effort to present itself as having moved away from 
the original doctrine of Sabino Arana and as a ‘movement’ rather than a political party.86 
The cleft between the orthodox/radical tendency and the reformist moderates continued 
to grow, and tensions were exacerbated by the outbreak of world war in 1914. Most 
‘radicals’ supported Germany, while the comunionistas, dictating the ‘official’ position of 
Basque nationalism, backed the Allies with a special fixation on England. An article from 
the early stages of the war titled “Glory to England” elucidates the party line: 
The politics of all the great powers, with the exception of one, Great Britain, 
are inspired by imperialism. [...] The only country—glory be to it!—among 
the belligerent great powers, that is not imperialist, is Great Britain. It was 
[once] imperialist; today it is not. All of its colonies are autonomous, because 
it has come to understand that there is a force greater than imperialism: 
nationalism. Its colonies possess free parliaments that issue laws, and 
even—and this is amazing—legislate on customs. With its ex-colonies, 
Great Britain forms a confederation of states. And see how, in the current 
circumstances, its children turn freely and spontaneously to help their 
mother!87 
 
While the Basque nationalists in neutral Spain clashed over which side to 
nominally support in the First World War, Ireland was forced to make more serious 
decisions.88 Some 210,000 Irishmen voluntarily fought in the war, a figure which includes 
Protestants and Catholics from across the island.89 In fact, Home Rule leader John 
Redmond’s paramilitary ‘Irish Volunteers’ were overwhelmingly in favour of the British war 
effort. Though as the Fenian saying went, ‘England's difficulty’ with the Axis powers could 
serve as ‘Ireland's opportunity’. As the most militant Irish nationalists began smuggling in 
weapons from Germany, the rift between moderate and radical, like in the Basque 
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Country, was evidently deepening, though in Ireland the stage was set for an armed 
confrontation. On April 24, 1916, when an uprising began in Dublin, one of its most eager 

































God, the Old Laws, and Revolution, 1916-1922 
 
 
“¡Jagi, jagi, euzkotaŕak, 
lasteŕ datoŕ eguna!” 
 
Evaristo Bustinza, 191590 
 
“Our day will come yet, believe me.” 
 
Michael Davin, 191691 
The 1916 Easter Rising and Basque Nationalism 
 
In 1915, the PNV expelled Luis Arana—the most authoritative old-guard independentist—
in part due to his germanophilia during the war.92 In 1916, the party name-change to CNV 
was made official, definitively marking the ascendancy of the moderates. It was, in a 
sense, the culmination of years of tension between the autonomist and independentist 
camps, which had been at odds since 1898, yet it marked the beginning of tensions more 
hostile than ever before. With news of the 1916 Easter Rising reaching Bilbao, the radicals 
of Euzko Gaztedija looked to Ireland as a role model. In fact, scholar Jon Juaristi relates 
a story from his grandfather—one of the founders of the youth organization—that Eli 
Gallastegi, radical nationalist par excellence, organized a volunteer corps to travel to 
Dublin to fight the British Army. Of course, the wishful expedition never materialized, 
because the fighting was over within a week, well before preparations could be finalized.93 
The Easter Rising, then, arrived at a key moment in the history of Basque 
nationalism. Historian Oliver O’Hanlon claims that “[c]overage of Irish affairs in the 
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Spanish press was largely confined to regions that were favourable to Irish independence, 
such as Catalonia, the Basque region, and Galicia.”94 However, contrary to what one 
might expect, the Basque Country was by no means generally ‘favourable to Irish 
independence’. The reaction of the CNV to events in Dublin was predictable, given their 
anglophilia. In their press organ Euzkadi, the CNV covered the insurrection as it unfolded 
from Monday, April 24 to Sunday, April 30. On April 26, they reported that the ‘German 
plot’ (a reference to the rebels’ attempts to secure German support) was soon to be put 
down by British General John Maxwell, “a military man of great intelligence and energy.”95 
They quoted Irish Parliamentary Party leader John Redmond and various British officials, 
assuring readers that most Irish people did not support the rebellion. 
However, it is evident that there was a hard-to-ignore pressure within the 
movement to back the Irish rebels. The director of Euzkadi and one of the key ideological 
leaders of Basque nationalism at the time, ‘Kizkitza’ (Engracio Aranzadi), wrote on May 
25: “That there are Basque nationalists who applaud the fenian movement condemned 
by Redmond and his 80 deputies is incomprehensible. That these Basque nationalists, 
allied with the eternal enemies of the Basque fatherland [Germany], face and fight us, 
proclaiming that we have betrayed our flag by siding with Redmond and Irish nationalism, 
is inexplicable.”96 The debate continued a few days later, with Aranzadi sarcastically 
characterizing the radical Basque hibernophiles as having come to the conclusion they 
too ought to form “a nucleus of anarchist patriots like that of [James] Connolly and the 
Irish [...] going out onto the streets shouting ‘long live free Euzkadi!’ and killing the agents 
of authority and the military.”97 
As José María Lorenzo notes, we do not know much about the position of radical 
Basque nationalists prior to 1916.98 The only somewhat-reliable medium of expression 
they had was Euzko Deya (1916-1923), the press organ of a Basque language 
promotional body created by Euzko Gaztedija.99 This marginal monthly publication only 
began in 1916, and since the opinions of the more radical youth members of the party 
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were not welcomed in the official publication(s), we have little evidence of their positions. 
The youthful dissidents found a means of expression later in 1916 with a new weekly 
publication by Euzko Gaztedija: Aberri, taken from the name of the earlier official PNV 
journal Aberri (1906-1908). From this point we can speak of the aberriano movement 
within Basque nationalism, defined in no small part by its pro-Irish orientation. Technically, 
they remained a part of the CNV, but represented a dissident tendency that party officials 
sought to reel in. The movement was born from the young ranks of the movement, whose 
discontent with the direction of the PNV/CNV was exacerbated by its critical response to 
the Rising. Eli Gallastegi was a chief ideological influence within this faction, and its most 
outstanding hibernophile. As we have seen, Basque nationalists had drawn parallels with 
Ireland prior to 1916 somewhat sporadically, but the birth of the aberriano movement 
inaugurated the consistent tendency to use Ireland “as a symbolic prism through which 
events in the Basque Country were refracted.”100                                             
One of the most serious confrontations between the radicals and moderates came 
about through their responses to the execution of fifteen of the Irish ‘rebel leaders’ in May 
1916. Luis Eleizalde wrote in Euzkadi that “Pearse, one of the executed leaders, counted 
on the support of the masses and ‘gallant allies in Europe’. This poor patriot, who was 
one of the intellectuals of Sinn Féin, gives the impression of an almost demented fool.”101 
Even more infuriating to the hibernophile radicals were the defamatory articles on the late 
Roger Casement by Engracio Aranzadi. Casement had first entered their field of view 
during the Easter Rising, when the CNV referred to him as an ‘agitator’ and an ‘enemy of 
England and the Irish’.102 The radicals had given much attention to Casement, referring 
to him as a ‘patriot martyr’ and held mass for him after his execution.103 Eli Gallastegi, 
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then serving as the representative of Euzko Gaztedija on the editorial board of Euzkadi, 




                                               
104 Lorenzo Espinosa, Gudari, 56-58. 
Figure 2: A front cover of the CNV-run journal Euzkadi, with an image of John Redmond 




Evolving Basque Opinions of Irish Nationalism 
 
Discussion of Ireland in the following years continued. Furthermore, comparisons were 
made between Ireland and the Basque Country by both aberrianos and comunionistas. 
Luis Eleizalde—one of the chief ideological influences within the CNV—was perhaps 
more hostile to Ulster unionism than he was to the ‘sinn-feiners’105 (calling it ‘violent’ and 
‘hypocritical’). He wrote an article in 1917 titled “The Basque Ulster,” denouncing the 
‘traitorous’ anti-autonomy Basque Liberals: “Our Ulster is not, like the Irish one, localized 
in a given region, but spread throughout the Basque Country.”106 
As Irish public opinion shifted in favour of the rebels, so too did the opinion of the 
CNV.107 While Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Féin party had no part in the Easter Rising (contrary 
to the reportage by Euzkadi), it quickly became a political movement that comprised 
members of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (a physical force 
republican organization founded in 1858, whose members were commonly known as 
‘Fenians’).108 By 1917, Sinn Féin had become “a truly national movement.”109 In the Irish 
general election of 1918, the overwhelming national desire for political independence was 
expressed with the resounding victory of Sinn Féin at the polls. Of the 105 seats to be 
held in the British parliament, Sinn Féin won 73, unionists 26, and the Irish Parliamentary 
Party a mere 6.110  
On January 21, 1919, in accordance with the abstentionist policy of the party, 
elected Sinn Féin members of parliament convened in Dublin, rather than London, to 
inaugurate Dáil Éireann, an underground Irish Assembly, a notional government that 
issued a declaration of independence and claimed jurisdiction over all 32 counties of 
Ireland. Coincidentally, that very date marked the beginning of the Irish War of 
Independence (or ‘the Anglo-Irish War’) (1919-1921), with the killing of two officers in the 
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Royal Irish Constabulary by members of the Irish Volunteers (soon to be known as the 
Irish Republican Army), acting on their own initiative.111  
Coverage of the Irish War of Independence in the pages of Euzkadi no longer 
carried sharp denunciations of the ‘sinn-feiners’.112 Both moderates and radicals took the 
opportunity to point out similarities between Ireland and the Basque Country. Euzkadi, in 
a distinctly Spanish analogy, referred to the loyalist element in both Ireland and the 
Basque Country as ‘loyal moors’, that is, troops of the colony who serve the empire.113 
However, they remained more optimistic about the Basque Country, claiming that while 
the Ulster unionists could not muster “more than ten thousand determined volunteers,” 
there were not even ten Basques who would willingly die for Spain, which was as 
historically ignorant and inaccurate as it was wishful.114 
Notwithstanding the shared pro-Irish feeling in this period, tensions between the 
aberrianos and the CNV peaked. On July 23, 1921, roughly two weeks after the Anglo-
Irish Truce that effectively ended the Irish War of Independence, Eli Gallastegi—then 
president of Euzko Gaztedija—was expelled from the party along with several other 
prominent youth leaders.115 On September 4, they formed a political party, reclaiming the 
name of the PNV.116 No longer constrained by the CNV, the radical aberrianos could now 
laud the Irish war effort against the British with unprecedented vigour: 
The final step of Irish nationalism has truly been a fast race towards victory. 
Since Sinn Féin threw itself on the path of heroism on Easter Week 1916, 
the Irish have had only three avenues: exile, revolt, and slavery; and Ireland, 
as a dignified and virile people, chose the most glorious route, that of 
revolution. [...] Basque nationalists, today representing the most ancient 
race in Europe—the only civilized one which still remains subjugated—filled 
with joy by the triumph of liberty and justice in Ireland, enthusiastically 
congratulate the Irish people, model of heroism and love of the nationalist 
ideal, and pray that Ireland attains eternal prosperity and absolute 
independence. LONG LIVE FREE IRELAND!117 
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In the same issue, Aberri announced that Euzko Gaztedija had invited “a notable publicist 
resident in Ireland,” known for his enthusiasm for Sinn Féin, to give a talk in the Basque 
Country on the political situation in Ireland following the War of Independence.118 
The Basque Dimension of Irish Foreign Affairs in Spain 
 
Dublin-based Spanish writer Ricardo Baeza arrived in Bilbao in late 1921 and was 
erroneously introduced as a supporter of Sinn Féin.119 In reality he was a staunch critic 
of Éamon de Valera, President of the Sinn Féin government, unbeknownst to the radical 
Basque nationalists.120 Baeza had written of the ‘Irish tragedy’ that “it suffices them [Sinn 
Féin] to know on what side England is, so they can take the opposite. If England is on the 
right, Ireland is on the left. As England often is correct, this leads Ireland frequently to 
error.” Baeza was in fact unable to comprehend why they wanted to leave Britain in the 
first place, remarking that “a discredited England would be fatal for the moral economy of 
the planet,” and that no other country could have exercised global hegemony more 
virtuously.121 
The newly-founded Irish delegation in Madrid angrily contacted Manuel (Manu) de 
la Sota (often known by his pen name Txanka), prominent aberriano and son of the 
famous Basque industrialist and moderate nationalist Ramón de la Sota. Ireland’s ‘Press 
Agent’ in Madrid Máire O’Brien wrote: “It would give me much satisfaction to be there face 
to face with Mr. Baeza at this platform in Bilbao, or any other platform, and personally 
hear the mean and despicable lies with which he has tried to dirty the name and reputation 
of President de Valera. Unfortunately I must deny myself this satisfaction given my 
position here.”122 
                                               
118 “Homenaje de Juventud Vasca a Irlanda,” Aberri no. 46 (Dec. 17, 1921). 
119 Núñez Seixas, “Ecos de pascua,” 465. 
120 Ricardo Baeza, “La intransigencia de Edmundo de Valera,” El Sol (Dec. 25, 1921). 
121 Ricardo Baeza, “Otra vez en Irlanda” (Dublin, 1921) in Hermes: Revista del País Vasco, Bilbao 1921-
1922 (Bilbao: Idatz Ekintza, 1988), 248-249. 
122 Letter from Máire O’Brien to Manuel de la Sota (Dec. 25, 1921) in Ricardo Baeza, La isla de los 





At this point, the Irish republican underground government was beginning its 
propaganda efforts on the continent. Spain as a whole was a relatively low priority for 
them, and their knowledge of Basque affairs was limited. Some basic foreign affairs 
decisions were made at a ministry meeting in March 1921 at which the Sinn Féin 
government organized propaganda campaigns across Europe. Their bureau in Germany 
was to be run at an estimated annual cost of £1000,123 and their agent in Paris was paid 
a yearly salary of £500, yet in Spain, there was no ‘official’ ambassadorial mission, and 
their ‘Press Agent’ was paid a comparatively meagre £250.124 Máire O’Brien arrived in 
Madrid on April 30, tasked with finding a building suitable for a base of operations.125 
 In a letter to the Sinn Féin Publicity Department on September 17, 1921, Máire 
O’Brien indicated that she had been in touch with a prominent member of the CNV: “Do 
you think you could supply the material for the articles requested by Senor de le Sota 
[sic].”126 O’Brien was sent copies of the Irish Bulletin, a publication produced by the 
Department of Propaganda, as well as Freeman’s Journal, Young Ireland, and Daily 
News to disseminate.127 She wrote on September 20, 1921, that “De la Sota’s paper 
‘Euzkadi’ gets the Bulletin. I will see that De la Sota himself gets copies. I know that he 
will make good use of them.”128 Ramón de la Sota, one of the wealthiest industrialists in 
Spain, had been the head of the early autonomist camp that joined the PNV in 1898, and 
was a strong anglophile (to the extent that he received the Order of the British Empire for 
his aid to Britain during the war). He was the father of Manu de la Sota, the prominent 
aberriano who received an angry letter from Máire O’Brien around this same time. The 
Irish propagandists seem to have had little understanding of this radical pro-Irish faction, 
and they might have benefitted from cultivating more serious ties. 
 The Irish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Robert Brennan, was instructed by 
de Valera to “maintain regular correspondence with our representatives and with our 
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friends in foreign countries, and to supply them with pamphlets and statistics as a 
foundation for informative articles upon Ireland.”129 Brennan noted in September 1921 
that Manu de la Sota had called him and was “most enthusiastic in the Irish cause,” though 
they never met personally.130 It is a distinct possibility that Brennan furnished the young 
Txanka with materials that informed the many articles on Ireland in Aberri, or that he 
obtained them indirectly from his father, who received them from O’Brien. 
 Máire O’Brien sent back cuttings from papers throughout Spain to the Dáil’s 
Publicity Department. She noted that “the provinces give us a good deal of publicity 
especially Barcelona and the North. The Madrid papers do very little for us but we must 
only worry them until they do.”131 This batch probably contained material from Euzkadi, 
but there is no evidence that O’Brien even knew of Aberri. The only sample of Spanish 
press cuttings sent back to Dublin that I could locate contained nothing from any Basque 
nationalist periodical.132  
 George Gavan Duffy, a key figure in Irish foreign affairs, had recommended that 
O’Brien carry out her work in Barcelona.133 Before establishing a permanent base in 
Madrid, O’Brien had been in Catalonia conducting propaganda work. Gavan Duffy noted 
in March 1921 that “Miss O'Brien in Barcelona is well in with the Catalans and she says 
that the next best thing to disseminating the Bulletin in Spanish from Paris would be to do 
so from Madrid. She thinks the Catalan devotion to us would make them generally 
overlook the annoyance of getting their Irish news from Madrid.”134 While the Irish were 
more interested in Catalonia than the Basque Country, Brennan did note: “Attempt made 
and with certain success to confound Irish case and Irish movement with that of Viscaya 
[Biscay] and Catalonia, and even to represent the I.R.A. as akin to the Socialist and 
Anarchical party of Barcelona.”135 
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Robert Brennan suggested that it would be “well to have Consuls if possible in 
Barcelona and Bilbao,” but the Irish ultimately focused their efforts in Madrid.136 And in 
any event, de Valera had stated with regard to ‘Pro-Irish Organisations’: “It would be well 
to have such organisations in every country. [...] There can be a general linking up of 
these later, but for Heaven’s sake let us not have a plethora of over-lapping organisations 
in each country. Let us put [our] strength behind one in each and do our best to develop 
it.”137 They mistakenly committed to establishing a presence in Madrid, where they had 
little support. 
 The basic mission of the Irish publicity campaign in Europe was to counteract the 
rival British propaganda that worked negatively against them. Evidently, the British had a 
hard time winning this battle in the Basque Country; their embassy in Madrid 
exasperatedly complained that “there is undoubtedly constant communication between 
the sinnfeiners [sic] and the separatists in Catalonia and the Basque provinces, and 
nothing we can do will stop the separatist press in these two regions from publishing anti-
English articles.”138 
A Young Irish Republican Comes to the Basque Country 
 
While correspondence between radical Basque nationalists and the Irish government was 
minimal, in 1922 the aberrianos were to make contact with a figure who would become a 
longstanding link between the two nations. This story begins in neither Ireland nor the 
Basque Country, but in Argentina. On April 5, 1901, an unwed teenage girl gave birth to 
a son in monastery in Buenos Aires. Her mother, Mary Martin (née Daly), an immigrant 
from County Westmeath, Ireland, took responsibility for the boy—Ambrose Victor 
Martin.139 
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 There had been Irish people in Argentina since the seventeenth century, though 
this migration was little more than a trickle until some 45,000 emigrants left Ireland for 
Argentina over the course of the nineteenth century.140 The Basques had a constant hand 
in the Spanish colonization of Argentina beginning in the sixteenth century. The best 
estimate for Basque emigration to Argentina (close to our period in question) claims that 
between 1840 and 1920, about 60,000 Basques came to Uruguay and Argentina (that is, 
the Plata and the Pampas).141 
 The family of Ambrose Martin resided in a small town in the province of Buenos 
Aires named Suipacha. Founded in 1864, from early on Suipacha was home to both 
Basque and Irish immigrant populations.142 Nearby towns bear Basque names 
(Gorostiaga, Azcuénaga, Zarate) and Irish names (Duggan, O’Higgins, O’Brien), to name 
only a few, giving some indication of the character of this region. The young Ambrose 
Martin would have grown up alongside a politically active Basque diaspora, and this 
environment seems to have been an incubator for Basque-Irish solidarity. 
In 1914, Ambrose Martin was sent to a boarding school in Mullingar, Westmeath, 
near where he still had relatives. Apparently, he took to the local culture quickly, joining 
Sinn Féin after the Easter Rising. He made a name for himself as a fiery orator and 
became involved with the IRA. His conspicuous profile caught the attention of the British 
authorities, who arrested him and imprisoned him in Liverpool.143 He was deported to 
Argentina on May 15, 1919, just as the IRA’s War of Independence campaign was 
developing.144  
If it is any indication of the prominent friends he had made, while in prison, Martin 
was visited by Margaret Mary Pearse, the sister of Pádraic Pearse, who wrote a letter to 
his Irish wife afterwards to console her. He was already friends with Eamon Bulfin, a fellow 
Buenos Aires-born Irish patriot, renowned for supposedly having raised the green flag of 
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the Irish Republic atop the General Post Office during the Easter Rising.145 Furthermore, 
he was in close contact with Laurence Ginnell, who served as the first Sinn Féin Director 
of Propaganda in 1919, and was the first Irish representative in Argentina, appointed by 
de Valera in 1921.146 
 Martin first returned to his grandmother’s house in Suipacha before becoming 
involved in republican political activity in the province of Buenos Aires. After nearly two 
years of propagandizing and fundraising, including a proposal to form an IRA reserve 
force in Argentina complete with regulation “Volunteer uniform” and training,147 Martin 
headed back to Ireland in 1922, presumably upon hearing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty at the 
end of 1921. However, on his way back, he made a detour in the Basque Country. Martin 
would later claim that he was visiting ‘old friends’ there.148  
 Martin made clear that he was not Basque himself on one of the occasions where 
he was mistakenly introduced as such in Ireland, probably on account of his accent. 
“Although Mr. [Ernie] O’Malley mentioned that I was a Basque, I am not. I am an Irishman, 
and my connection with the Basques was something similar to his own,” he declared 
many years later.149 This seems to rule out a genetic connection—his biological father, 
for instance, if he knew anything of him. There is also evidence that Martin had a reading 
knowledge of Basque.150 If he could in fact read the letters he received that were written 
in Basque, his exposure to the language must have been considerable.151 
In any case, it is interesting that one of the most significant manifestations of 
Basque-Irish solidarity bore roots across the Atlantic Ocean. Some sources refer to Martin 
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at this point as a ‘leader’ of Sinn Féin.152 This would be arguably an overstatement of his 
role; Martin was far from a senior figure in the movement overall, but his charisma and 
zeal made him known to several key personalities. He might have been a fairly notable 
figure within the Irish republican community in Argentina, but at this point, the young 
Martin was by no means famed back in Ireland. Aberri, of course, did not diminish his 
stature. On the front page, it advertised on March 31, 1922: 
Tomorrow, Saturday, the 1st of April, an interesting patriotic act in 
commemoration of the heroes of the Easter Week in Dublin and all the Irish 
patriots who have dedicated their lives to the nationalist ideal will take place 
in the halls of the [Euzko Gaztedija] of Bilbao. 
A young Irish personality, of high profile in the modern nationalist 
movement, soul of the valuable patriotic organizations that he personally 
founded in South America, inadvertently finds himself among us, recently 
arrived from the capital of the Plata. 
On his way to his dear Ireland, he took the attention to visit our Basque 
Youth, and before taking leave from us, would like to leave us a pleasant 
memory of his brief stay in the metropolis of Basque nationalism. 
This distinguished Irish patriot—who has been imprisoned in an English jail 
for defending Ireland—about whose personality we cannot be any clearer, 
will warmly address all nationalists resident in Bilbao. 
In this conference he will explain the history of the Irish nationalist 
movement since this admirable people proclaimed the independent 
Republic of Ireland. 
GO, PATRIOTS, TO LISTEN TO THIS MAN WHO HAS LIVED THE MOST 
SUBLIME HOURS OF IRISH NATIONALISM!153 
 
Martin made an overwhelmingly positive impression on the radical Basque nationalists, 
who wrote in the next issue of Aberri: 
Never before have we seen our patriotic youth as impassioned as last 
Saturday, fascinated by the fiery speech of the most eloquent Irish orator 
who honoured the podium of [Euzko Gaztedija]. 
For the space of an hour and a half he held us in suspense with his 
captivating words—ignited with love for his wretched Ireland—this young 
Irish patriot that has risen before us, vibrant and mysterious, to show our 
dispirited race the only path to salvation for peoples who aspire to their 
liberty. 
With his moving, prophetic, and suggestive voice, he gave us an emotional 
account of the tragic epic of Ireland the glorious, which found in the 
patriotism of its children a mysterious and irresistible force that drives them 
against the enemy race, against the deadly, cunning, and dominating race, 
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with such decisiveness and force, that will make us see very soon the 
resurrection of its national body. 
In his brief stay here, on the way to his homeland, this young patriot—a 
character of steel—did not rest a single moment from the propagation of the 
ideals of the Irish Republic, of which he is a selfless and valiant defender.154 
 
Martin’s most influential speech in the Basque Country was on the following 
Monday, April 10, in which he spoke about the role of Irish women in the nationalist 
struggle.155 This day marked the foundation of Emakume Abertzale Batza (EAB—
Association of Patriot Women), inspired by the Irish republican women’s group Cumann 
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Aberri and the Irish Influence 
 
As we will see, this visit in 1922 sparked a lasting and fruitful friendship between Ambrose 
Martin and Eli Gallastegi, then serving as president of Euzko Gaztedija.157 But on a 
broader level, it deepened the (radical) Basque nationalist fascination with the Irish 
example. Most often it was a positive example, contrasted with the ‘apathy’ of the Basque 
public at large. Ireland was a nation that had been ‘awoken’ while the Basque Country 
remained dormant. However, we ought to be careful about how we characterize the 
nature of the ‘Irish influence’. Historian Gaizka Fernández states that 
the aberrianos took Sinn Féin as a model, the formation linked to the IRA. 
The influence of this movement on the PNV-Aberri is perceptible on different 
levels. On one hand, in the rejection of participating in democratic 
institutions. On the other, in the importance given to counting on branch 
organizations, for which Aberri formed a women’s association [EAB], and 
developed the pre-existing theatre groups and the [mendigoxales]. It 
thereby configured itself as a party-community. A final aspect in which 
radical Basque nationalism was inspired by Irish republican movement was 
the importance it gave to propaganda, violence, self-sacrifice, and the cult 
of prisoners and martyrs as a means of making political gains.158 
 
While in these cases it is fair to say that the Basque nationalists were inspired by their 
Irish counterparts, it should also be made clear that these were not novel concepts 
imported into Basque nationalism. While Irish republican abstentionism was lauded by 
many Basque nationalists, the PNV already had a tradition of abstaining from the general 
elections,159 and Sabino Arana had claimed decades earlier that Biscay was technically 
never legally part of Spain. The general strategy of combining politics with cultural 
nationalist activities predated the fixation on Ireland that came after the Easter Rising. As 
mentioned earlier, the formal political integration of the mendigoxales occurred in 1908, 
and nationalist propaganda events included these as well as traditional dancers before 
1916.160 The use of prisoners and martyrs for political capital also had a well-established 
history within Basque nationalism. The original Aberri (1906-1908) regularly featured 
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appeals for donations for political prisoners and encouraged its readers to visit them. 
Bizkaitarra (1909-1913) also featured a list of political prisoners, their sentences, and 
visitation hours on the front cover of many issues.  
The broader question of the Irish influence is best addressed by Núñez—it “must 
be understood, rather, as an external stimulus that brought about the crystallization of 
political tendencies and organizational inclinations nested in the jelkide [radical/orthodox] 
movement itself.”161 In tracing Irish ‘influences’ there is a potential danger of downplaying 
native developments within Basque nationalism, or overlooking broader trends in 
European nationalisms that transcend a Basque-Irish exchange. Ambrose Martin was 
remembered as playing some role in the foundation of EAB, but it is important to 
remember that the idea of Cumann na mBan was not entirely alien in the Basque Country, 
where women had already been playing a role in nationalist politics for years and paying 
attention to the Irish example well before Ambrose Martin arrived in Bilbao.162 
Aberri concentrated on defending the nationalist orthodoxy—the ‘original’ 
teachings of Sabino Arana—and found a way to fuse this position with its ardent support 
of the Irish Revolution. What they took from a speech by Ambrose Martin was that “these 
two axes of Homeland and Liberty, and God and Faith, have been and will be in Ireland, 
like in the Basque Country, that which save them. Already, Sabino, the Master, with that 
clear vision, with that intuition, with that immortal love, taught us the way when he told us: 
he who does not love God is not a true patriot, but neither can you love God without being 
a patriot.”163 While the aberrianos found justification in the words of Arana for their backing 
of the Irish struggle against the British, the moderates found in the philosophy of the same 
man reason to laud England, even after the Irish Revolution: “England is a great people 
that Sabino taught us to love, and because Basque nationalism demands it, we are 
anglophiles. And because of the great affinity between the English and the Basque 
people.”164 
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War and Exile, 1922-1927 
 
 
“The sentimental and practical arguments urged by the Catalans in defence of their 
effort to set up a tiny six-county state it is not easy for an outsider to appreciate. On 
quite another plane are the claims of the Basques, beyond all doubt the oldest and 
easily one of the most interesting of the European peoples.” 
 
Fr. John Ryan, 1924165 
 
 
The Irish War of Independence was finally settled, after a five-month truce, with the Anglo-
Irish Treaty in December 1921. The delegation sent by Dáil Éireann to negotiate the treaty 
included Arthur Griffith and the iconic Michael Collins, veteran of the Easter Rising, 
Minister for Finance in the Dáil government from 1919 to 1922, and the last president of 
the Irish Republican Brotherhood. The delegation, from which President Éamon de Valera 
was notably absent, signed the contentious treaty, which upheld the partition of the island 
into a 6-county loyalist entity in Northern Ireland and a 26-county state in the south, which 
was to be a Dominion within the Commonwealth.166 
 A civil war erupted in June 1922 from the so-called ‘Treaty split’, between a majority 
who supported the compromise of a 26-county ‘Irish Free State’, as it came to be called, 
and those who would not settle for less than a republic, as had been established in 1919. 
Michael Collins headed the Provisional Government of the Irish Free State in a war 
against the anti-Treaty insurgents politically headed by Éamon de Valera.167 
 Ambrose Martin returned to Ireland in April 1922, shortly before the outbreak of 
civil war. Ironically, Martin’s inspirational speeches in the Basque Country on the near-
mythic Irish struggle for freedom coincided with the very moment that the Irish nationalist 
movement was at its least inspirational, as it split into pro- and anti-Treaty factions. Martin 
supported the anti-Treaty camp, which would have significant repercussions later on. 
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Naturally, his Basque nationalist comrades followed the Irish Civil War (June 1922-May 
1923) with interest. In March 1922, during the lead-up to the war, Aberri was well aware 
of the possibility of a civil conflict: 
While British imperialism continues the ‘bulldog plan’, clinging on to 
imposing its viewpoint on the Irish, whose nationalist ideal we love dearly, 
and we are enthusiastic admirers of the heroic Irish people, at the moment 
we must be content that the political talent of the leaders of Sinn Féin will 
find some other formula—like that of the last Sinn Féin assembly—that 
moves the wretched Ireland away from the most horrible tragedy of a 
people: civil war.168 
 
The aberrianos resolutely supported the pact between Éamon de Valera and Michael 
Collins signed on May 20 that would have had the pro- and anti-Treaty wings of Sinn Féin 
running jointly in the general election, which the British government contested as a breach 
of the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.169  
During the Irish Civil War, Aberri refrained from harsh condemnations of the pro-
Treaty side and blamed the British above all. “We believe that the Anglo-Irish Treaty,” an 
article in Aberri read, “will go down in history as the ultimate product of the cunning and 
intrigue of British imperialism.”170 They praised martyred anti-Treaty republicans: “Cathal 
Brugha! Harry Boland! And other anonymous heroes of Irish independence! Praise be 
upon you for having known what it is to die for the homeland, even dying at the hands of 
your own brothers, unconsciously turned into puppets of British imperialism.” However, 
they added: “Arthur Griffith! Michael Collins! Mercy be upon you. We will not call you 
traitors and perjurers as some of your brothers have done.”171 Notably though, this article 
did not mention the death of Michael Collins, who had been killed in an anti-Treaty IRA 
ambush almost three weeks earlier (August 22, 1922). 
Overall, Aberri did not frequently discuss the war as it unfolded. Lacking a strong 
stance and perhaps a reliable source of information, Aberri ran only a few articles on the 
conflict. At the end of the Irish Civil War, with a Free State victory, Aberri reported that 
“those who bear the most responsibility for the civil war that has ravaged Ireland during 
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these last 12 months are the English leaders, who obliged those of the so-called Free 
State to disarm the IRA, and who provided arms and munitions to the colonials, and 
seized countless shipments of arms and ammunition sent to the republicans by their North 
American compatriots.”172 
 Eli Gallastegi, more radical than most rank-and-file aberrianos, saw in the Irish 
Civil War a mirror image of the same tensions within Basque nationalism, simply at a 
more advanced stage: 
We read daily in the press about new shootings of the so-called ‘rebels,’ 
‘separatists’, of Ireland [Free State executions of captured IRA soldiers], the 
nationalists who do not want ties with the nation that drowned the life of their 
homeland in blood. They are the ones who die gloriously, completing the 
sworn oath for their honour. This development of life in Ireland is a prime 
example, now with more relevance than ever, that must be considered. [...] 
Don’t you see it? There is already an organization, there are nationalists 
trained by them here, that fight separatism from now on, that demand and 
desire union with Spain, that support the movements of foral leagues, 
autonomists, against independentism; that unscrupulously attack those who 
they call ‘separatists’. What will happen, then, when the fatal hour comes? 
Spain, one day, will concede ample autonomy to Catalonia, Galicia…to the 
Basque Country as well. The ‘unionists’ will therefore form a Basque army 
of ‘regulars’ armed by Spain, with whom they will fight, by blood and fire, 
without mercy, against the ‘Basque separatist rebels’... And then, they 
themselves—our compatriots!—will shoot us. No exaggeration.173 
 
Gallastegi’s rivals in the CNV, his prophesized ‘unionists’ (though more akin to 
‘Free Staters’ in his analogy), also took interest in the Irish Civil War. They maintained 
their admiration for England by pinning the central blame for violence in Ireland on Ulster, 
which was called in Euzkadi the “enemy of the southern Irish and semi-anonymous 
instigator of many of the vicissitudes that Erin bemoans in her misfortune.”174 Another 
article claimed that “the anti-Irish propaganda of the friends of the Ulsterites is in large 
part the cause of that which today so sadly occurs between the countrymen of Ireland.”175 
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 Worthy of mention is the fact that the editors of Euzkadi were still receiving news 
reports from the Irish propagandists in Madrid at the beginning of the Irish Civil War.176 
The first Irish Press Agent, Máire O’Brien, had resigned from her diplomatic post in Madrid 
due to her refusal to support the Anglo-Irish Treaty,177 but the office continued its basic 
task, albeit with some difficulties. Ormonde Grattan Esmonde took charge in March 1922, 
but was frustrated with boredom and his lack of Spanish, reporting back to Dublin that 
“there is not enough work for two people in Madrid, and an Irish secretary is not 
necessary.”178 He wrote on September 20, 1922: 
Up to the middle of July, the publication of the Spanish Bulletin was 
continued; I noticed that it was frequently quoted by the provincial press, 
but rarely by that of the Capital. Owing to the state of affairs at home, it 
was necessary to deal mainly with Belfast and trade matters. I also wrote 
some twenty articles about Ireland, for different journals, mostly Catholic, 
in various parts of the country.179 
 
The Irish press bureau in Madrid, aligned with the Treatyite Provisional 
Government, disseminated news via the Boletín irlandés. The CNV evidently received 
copies of this paper, which probably avoided much coverage of the Treaty split and the 
ensuing civil war, as Esmonde hinted at (though its publication ceased within the first 
month of the conflict). Euzkadi echoed much of the tone it was fed by the Irish 
propagandists. In fact, the moderate Basque nationalists uncritically reproduced large 
portions of text from the Boletín irlandés in their articles. Their coverage of the war 
between so-called ‘loyal troops’ and ‘irregular troops’ or ‘rebels’ differed even in its basic 
nomenclature from that of the Aberri radicals, who sarcastically employed such terms. Its 
major point of departure from the Irish propaganda, however, was its steadfast 
anglophilia. Through a critical fixation on Ulster, Euzkadi positioned itself in favour of the 
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pro-Treaty Irish nationalists and the British government, while remaining relatively 
forgiving of the anti-Treatyites. 
 In December 1922, amidst the Irish Civil War, the Irish Free State formally came 
into existence, and by May 1923 the anti-Treaty IRA had been defeated.180 The Irish 
general election of August 1923 saw Éamon de Valera at the head of Sinn Féin, though 
incarcerated shortly before the vote when he emerged from hiding. The pro-Treaty wing 
of Sinn Féin split and formed a new party, Cumann na nGaedheal (League of the Gaels), 
led by William T. Cosgrave, which won the election, holding 63 out of 153 seats. However, 
their victory had been expected to be by a significantly larger margin—Sinn Féin’s 
considerable 44 seats came as something of an embarrassment to the new government. 
Nonetheless, de Valera’s anti-Treaty republicans abstained from the Free State Dáil, 
permitting Cosgrave to govern without opposition.181 
 Before the election, Aberri made clear that it supported de Valera, referring to him 
somewhat erroneously as the “illustrious leader” of the IRA. It was the noble defeat of the 
anti-Treaty forces that made them so exalted amongst radical Basque nationalists, who 
wrote that they “sacrificed their lives and peace for the sake of their national duty and 
honour, giving with their virile and heroic gesture a practical teaching to all the nationalists 
of oppressed peoples.”182 Despite the trauma of the Irish Civil War, Aberri still explicitly 
called the Irish republicans ‘an example to follow’: 
We have much to imitate from the Irish, we will need to struggle and suffer 
like them, but we have reason to have more hope. England, despite its 
power, cannot bring down young Ireland; do you think that Spain, a nation 
inferior to England in all aspects, could? Not at all. Well then, if Spain could 
not bring down this Ireland, let’s be like Ireland, let’s imitate those Irish, and 
triumph will be ours.183 
 
‘Triumph’, however, as the aberrianos understood it, meant moral or spiritual victory. In 
no other sense of the word could anti-Treaty Irish republicans be considered triumphant 
                                               
180 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan Books, 2012), 35. 
181 Timothy O’Neil, “Reframing the Republic: Republican Socio-Economic Thought and the Road to 
Fianna Fail, 1923-26,” in A Formative Decade: Ireland in the 1920s, ed. Mel Farell, Jason Knirck, and 
Ciara Meehan (Sallins: Irish Academic Press, 2015), 160; J. J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and 
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 94-95. 
182 “En Euzkadi sobran hombres,” Aberri no. 8 (Jun. 6, 1923). 




in 1923. The Basque separatists were clear about this, proclaiming that “defeat is often 
convenient. Oh how Irish nationalism has learned, with its failures in some of its 
positions!”184 
Aberri indicated in June 1923 that there were serious diplomatic plans for formal 
relations between the PNV and de Valera himself as ‘President’ of the notional Irish 
Republic. The article read that Laurence Ginnell (recently deceased, though they seem 
unaware of this) had arranged for them to be represented before de Valera by “a dear 
friend of ours,” which almost certainly refers to Ambrose Martin.185 However, Martin was 
in no position to represent the PNV in Dublin. He was allegedly “continually on the run” 
from the Free State authorities during this time and was incarcerated for an unknown 
duration in Athlone prison (County Westmeath) in December 1922. In fact, like thousands 
of other anti-Treaty IRA veterans, Martin emigrated after the civil war when the hope of 
establishing a republic seemed forlorn.186 
Basque and Irish Nationalists on the Run 
 
Martin’s desire to leave Ireland coincided with an opportunity for another political 
adventure abroad. In September 1923, the Spanish government was overthrown in a 
military coup headed by Miguel Primo de Rivera. The new regime took little time in 
outlawing separatist parties; after a fleeting moment of toleration with heavy censure, 
Aberri ceased publication that same year. The PNV was forced underground, but the CNV 
was condoned due to its classification as a moderate regionalist party.187 Martin arrived 
in the Basque Country at some time in 1924,188 but his entry into Spain was reported to 
Spanish authorities by the British. “Some Basque nationalists,” undoubtedly including his 
friend Gallastegi, sheltered Martin for a couple of months.189 In late 1924, at a 
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mendigoxale outing in the mountains, the Spanish police arrested some figures including 
“an official from the Irish ‘Sinn Féin’ army” and Gallastegi.190  
By 1925 there was an Irish ‘activist’ named ‘Ambrosi’ (the Catalan equivalent of 
the name Ambrosio/Ambrose) hiding out in Paris, at the office of Estat Català (Catalan 
State), a radical Catalan separatist party exiled in France.191 According to a firsthand 
Catalan source, Martin’s stay was arranged by de Valera himself: 
[Éamon de Valera], with whom Francesc Macià was in personal contact, 
sent us a boy [who was] ‘overly committed’ in Dublin, who needed to stay 
far away from the British police for some time. Ambrosi (we never knew his 
surname) was a firm and strong boy, with irresistible energy and 
decisiveness [...] Ambrosi, though, took things a little too far. He proposed 
that we raise guards, as if it were effectively a military base. When we 
dissuaded him, he went on to say that, for security, he would go to sleep in 
the attic, from where he would guard the entrance of the building day and 
night. And so he did. One night, however, all of us and the whole 
neighbourhood were awoken by shooting that came from our attic. Ambrosi, 
shouting like a fool, almost convinced us that night that the Black and Tans 
[crown force counter-insurgents in the Irish War of Independence] had come 
to Bois-Colombes [Paris] to capture him and take him back to Ireland.192 
 
Ambrose Martin became close friends with Francesc Macià, Catalan president in 
exile and founder of Estat Català, as well as fellow anti-Treatyite Leopold Kerney, then 
serving as the envoy of the underground Irish Republic in Paris.193 Kerney’s position was 
the source of much confusion, as it coexisted with the official diplomatic office of the Irish 
Free State, and the French had a hard time distinguishing them.194 Macià, Kerney, and 
de Valera were all in close contact, a network which must also have included the young 
Martin to some degree.195 Martin was able to provide his Catalan hosts with a monthly 
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copy of Inis Fáil: Bulletin de la Ligue pour l’Indépendance de l’Irlande, a Sinn Féin 
publication beginning in April 1925.196 He also wrote a series of short essays for them on 
IRA tactics in the War of Independence and the Irish Civil War.197 The Catalan nationalists 
might have consulted Martin’s guides as they organized a guerrilla army to invade and 
‘liberate’ Catalonia in November 1926, a plot which was ultimately discovered and 
suppressed by the French police.198 
 The situation of Irish propagandists in France was analogous to that in Spain. The 
capital, where they focused their efforts, was mostly barren soil, while the peripheral 
regions with sub-state nationalist movements were far more interested in establishing 
contact. Kerney reported back to de Valera from Paris in 1924: “There is no possibility of 
collecting funds here for the support of the Republican cause. You may remember that 
when the Republican Loan was floated, a whole-page advertisement was inserted in one 
of the leading papers here; as far as I know that costly advertisement did not bring us in 
a single franc.”199 Meanwhile, they had ardent supporters in Brittany,200 and in Flanders, 
Belgium, for example.201  
However, the republican propagandists had little interest in a serious relationship 
with any of these groups. Kerney wrote that he had “not sought close contact with 
Catalans, Flemings, and others who are outside the British Empire.”202 Their reaction to 
the ‘League of Oppressed Nations’ project is especially telling. The project was first 
envisioned by Basque nationalists, but credited to Francesc Macià, who proposed it 
internationally in September 1924. The stated purpose of this organization was to “bring 
to the international stage the plight of our struggles to attain liberty and freedom for our 
respective homelands,” and it was to comprise Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, 
Ireland, Egypt, India, and the Rif Republic.203 The Basque delegate for the League, 
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Francisco de Gaztañaga, contacted de Valera to gauge his interest. De Valera wrote to 
Kerney:204  
Bearer, Francisco de Gastanaga [sic], has called on me with reference to 
the project of forming a “League of Oppressed Nations.” I am very interested 
in the formation of such a League, and I wish you to attend, on our behalf, 
such preliminary conferences as may be held with reference to it. You will, 
of course, avoid all commitments until they are sanctioned by us here in 
express terms. I would like you to compile a concise dossier of data with 






Philippine Islands, etc. 
showing the objects of these organisations, their several constitutions, their 
official Chiefs, etc. Much of this information can be got from their 
representatives in Paris.205 
  
Kerney’s response is unknown but can be largely deduced by de Valera’s following reply: 
I dictate this hurriedly to let you know that I fully agree with your reasoning 
as to the inadvisability of linking up in a formal League with any oppressed 
peoples save those of the British Empire. Of course we sympathise with all, 
but a formal League is another matter.206 
 
 It might be said, therefore, that formal relations with any Basque nationalist 
organization on the part of de Valera’s republicans were precluded. For a diplomatic 
mission of a state with no real existence, it was surprisingly pragmatic. It was ironic, but 
perhaps practical, that their interest in ‘linking up’ formally did not extend beyond the 
reaches of the empire from which they sought desperately to dissociate completely.207  
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 In May 1925, Eli Gallastegi, having already been arrested at least once alongside 
an Irishman of unconfirmed identity, was bold enough to host his bachelor party turned 
political rally in Bilbao, attended by over 500 people.208 Invitees included his Catalan and 
Galician associates, and probably Ambrose Martin. The gathering was broken up by the 
police, with Gallastegi being detained and given a later court date to face a sentence of 
potentially twelve years in prison. In the meantime, he was forced to check in with the 
Guardia Civil every two weeks, but chose to flee with his family to the French Basque 
Country and then to Mexico, where he remained in exile for several years.209  
 Like many of his Basque comrades, Ambrose Martin also chose to leave for Latin 
America. In 1927, he arrived in Buenos Aires once again. Several key figures in Estat 
Català, including Francesc Macià, also left for Argentina in 1927.210 Returning to his family 
village of Suipacha, Ambrose Martin set up a small café called the Confitería Vasco-
Irlandesa, which he ran for a few years with little success.211 The shared experience of 
being ‘on the run’ was perhaps one source of Basque-Irish solidarity going forward, 
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New Hopes and Hatreds, 1930-1936  
 
 
“I wonder can our enemies know that by killing us they are creating a hundred thousand 
of us. History has told them that, Irish history more frequently than any other. They must 
never read history.” 
Frank Gallagher, 1920212 
 
“Y Euzkadi hoy necesita persecuciones, sacrificios; gente dispuesta al sacrificio, a la 
muerte [...] Ejemplos abundantes y elocuentes nos ofrece la historia de Irlanda.” 
 
Eli Gallastegi, 1934213 
  
Basque Nationalism and Spanish Politics 
 
In Spain, Miguel Primo de Rivera resigned in January 1930, and King Alfonso XIII 
appointed General Dámaso Berenguer to continue dictatorial rule, though this short-lived 
regime was far milder. The Basque nationalists of Aberri quickly seized the opportunity to 
revitalize political activity and called for a reunification of the PNV and CNV in February.214 
On November 15, 1930, the new PNV was reconstituted, uniting the CNV and the Aberri-
PNV. The common doctrine was adherence to the orthodox motto of ‘God and the Old 
Laws’, confessionalism, the primacy of race in Basque identity, and the underlying 
sovereignty of the individual Basque provinces.215 However, the aberriano separatists 
crippled themselves by inviting the more numerous comunionistas to join them; the CNV 
being more popular, they rapidly dominated the PNV and marginalized advocates of 
separatism.216 
 Spanish elections in April 1931 were a massive victory for republicans, who 
promptly proclaimed the Spanish Second Republic. Eli Gallastegi returned from Mexico 
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shortly thereafter, with political inclinations as ambitious and radical as ever before. In 
September, he participated in the first ever hunger strike in Basque nationalism, at 
Larrinaga Prison, Bilbao.217 As noted by his biographer, Gallastegi, well-read in Irish 
history, certainly had on his mind the famous example of Terence MacSwiney—a Sinn 
Féin activist who died after a 73-day hunger strike in a London prison in 1920—when he 
announced the hunger strike.218 Indicative of the importance radical Basque nationalists 
attached to MacSwiney’s hunger strike, one of Gallastegi’s comrades wrote that had he 
not died, “Irish liberation would have been delayed by many years, like is happening in 
the Basque Country.”219 As Gallastegi would write many times, the radical Basque 
nationalists eagerly awaited a martyr from their own ranks.  
 On Easter Sunday, 1932, Basque nationalists celebrated the first Aberri Eguna 
(Fatherland Day). Its primary purpose was to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of 
Sabino Arana’s mythologized ‘revelation’ that the Basque Country was a nation, which 
took place on Easter Sunday, 1882 while in conversation with his brother Luis. However, 
the date lent Aberri Eguna quite naturally to association with the 1916 Easter Rising as 
well. Among the organizers of the event were Gallastegi and Ceferino Jemein (the 
husband of the first president of EAB).220 Some 65,000 people attended the event in 
Bilbao,221 which served also as an homage to the 1916 Rising, which ironically had been 
bitterly attacked in the most prominent Basque nationalist paper as it unfolded only 16 
years earlier.222 
The fall of the military dictatorship in Spain rendered regional autonomy a more 
realistic objective than ever before. The PNV supported an initiative in 1931 for a statute 
that would see the creation of a ‘Basque state’ comprising the four Spanish Basque 
provinces of Biscay, Gipuzkoa, Araba, and Navarre. Hoping for a restoration of the fueros, 
the Carlists, who still dominated in Navarre and Araba, cautiously backed the proposal, 
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even if they disagreed with the rhetoric of ‘Basque nationhood’.223 Navarre presented a 
particular challenge to the aspirations of Basque nationalists. While Biscay, Gipuzkoa, 
and Araba were brought under Castilian control at the turn of the twelfth century, Navarre 
remained an independent kingdom until conquered in 1512. Besides this sense of 
historical difference, “spoken Basque had retreated further there than in any of the other 
three provinces,” and was now primarily limited to the northern portion of the province.224 
Historically, Navarre was ethno-linguistically Basque, though many considered 
‘Navarrese’ and ‘Basque’ to be distinct, and the Basque nationalist movement had little 
chance of replacing Carlism—the still-dominant monarchist political ideology—in this 
province. 
Country-wide parliamentary elections in June saw the PNV in a right-wing coalition 
with Carlists and Catholic independents, spurred by their resolute differences with leftists 
on the questions of religion and autonomy.225 The decisive electoral victory of the right in 
the Basque Country set it apart from the rest of Spain as the only region where the left 
did not win.226 They moved ahead with an autonomy statute, though it ultimately had to 
be watered down to bring it in line with the new Spanish constitution. Most Carlists could 
not bear the thought of secular, and in some cases, avowedly anti-clerical, republicans in 
Madrid having any say in religious matters at home, and were left by their party to vote 
on the statute as they saw fit.227 It passed with 94.4 percent approval in Biscay, 95.1 
percent in Gipuzkoa, 84.8 percent in Araba, and failed in Navarre with 53.2 percent of the 
votes against it.228 Blinkhorn remarks that “to such students of the Irish problem as the 
Basque Nationalists, the lesson of the Navarrese vote ought to have been obvious. As 
with Ulster and Ireland, the province of Navarre simply did not fit neatly into the kind of 
political organism sought by the most zealous advocates of Basque nationhood.”229 
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However, there is no evidence that the Basque nationalists saw Navarre as ‘the 
Basque Ulster’. While Blinkhorn in retrospect points to a clear parallel between Navarre 
and Northern Ireland, it is important to keep in mind that there is nothing to indicate a 
contemporary understanding of such a relationship. While we have seen Basque 
nationalists explicitly liken ‘Ulster’ to a broad ‘traitorous element’ within Basque society, it 
was never identified with a specific region or province. On the day after Navarre’s rejection 
of the four-province autonomy statute, Euzkadi maintained hope that Navarre would still 
form a political union with the other Basque provinces of Spain in the future. The leading 
article clarified that they (the PNV) still loved Navarre and all its people, save for the few 
‘traitorous leaders’ who defrauded the Navarrese people and sold out the province ‘for 
thirty pieces of silver’.230 Their understanding of Navarre does not form a neat parallel 
with the Irish republican understanding of Ulster (or rather, the six partitioned counties of 
Northern Ireland), the political and historical dynamics of which were manifestly different 
than those of Navarre. Moreover, crucially, the lesson that the Basque nationalists ought 
to have learned from this failure may not have been as obvious as Blinkhorn suggests. 
The Basque nationalist alliance with the Carlists was irreversibly wounded, which 
encouraged the Spanish moderate left to make overtures to the PNV. They proceeded, 
yet again, with a new autonomy statute, this time without Navarre, and now with the 
reluctant blessing of the left.231 It passed in all three provinces, albeit with a staggeringly 
high abstention rate of 41.5 percent in Araba, whose affinity with Navarre made many 
voters wary of this union.232 The statute then needed approval in parliament, which, as 
we will see, proved to be an arduous task. 
A New Era of Basque-Irish Relations 
 
At a Sinn Féin assembly in March 1926, Éamon de Valera proposed that elected party 
members take their seats in the legally-recognized Free State Dáil. De Valera had been 
eyeing more pragmatic means of achieving a republic since 1923, and was prepared to 
abandon Sinn Féin’s iconic policy of abstention from any political establishment other 
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than the revolutionary Dáil. However, his one caveat was that the Oath of Allegiance be 
removed.233  
De Valera was narrowly outvoted on this motion, and he left Sinn Féin to form a 
new party: Fianna Fáil (Warriors of Destiny).234 This new party took a tremendous bite out 
of Sinn Féin, which won only 5 seats in the June 1927 election (a loss of 42 seats) 
compared to Fianna Fáil’s 44, and Cumann na nGaedheal’s 47 (a loss of 16 seats).235 A 
second general election in September of the same year saw an impoverished Sinn Féin 
not running a single candidate. Fianna Fáil raised its seat count to 57, and Cumann na 
nGaedheal to 62.236 De Valera’s republicans closed the gap (and then some) in the 1932 
election, winning and forming a new government with 72 seats and the support of 7 
Labour deputies. William T. Cosgrave lost his position as President of the Executive 
Council to his old civil war rival with 57 seats.237  
Obligated to take the Oath of Allegiance after a legal change in 1927, Éamon de 
Valera creatively took the oath “without taking it—‘signing the book’ without reading, 
repeating, or listening to the words of the oath of allegiance.”238 In 1932, de Valera found 
himself at the head of the very state apparatus he had fought against less than a decade 
earlier, and thus began his efforts to ‘republicanize’ the Irish Free State from within. As 
part of the republicanization campaign, de Valera suspended the payment to Britain of 
land annuities, which initiated a series of retaliatory protectionist measures known as the 
‘Economic War’ or the ‘Anglo-Irish Trade War’.239 Gradually undoing the terms of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty, de Valera abolished the oath of allegiance, and all-but-removed the 
position of Governor-General.240 
One important change in the new Ireland of Fianna Fáil was the rehabilitation of 
republicans persecuted under the Cumann na nGaedheal government. IRA prisoners 
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were released in 1932, and the proscription of the IRA and its newspaper was lifted (until 
1936).241 This change of climate was favourable for the anti-Treaty veteran Ambrose 
Martin, then in Argentina politically mobilizing the Irish diaspora, running a small-town 
‘Basque-Irish café’, and networking with Basque nationalists based in Buenos Aires.242 
Martin made his way back to Ireland, but not before another detour in the Basque Country. 
 Martin returned to the Basque Country to give another series of speeches as it 
prepared to vote on the first autonomy statute in June 1932. The first, given in a packed 
conference hall in Algorta, covered the history of oppression in Ireland with a special focus 
on the fatal hunger strike of Terence MacSwiney—a timely reference, coming less than 
a year after the first Basque hunger strike led by his friend Eli Gallastegi. He also gave 
an overview of recent events, explaining that Ireland was now in good hands with the 
electoral victory of Fianna Fáil.243 The Basque nationalist women’s organization, EAB, 
celebrated the anniversary of its reformation (it had been proscribed from 1923 until the 
advent of the Republic) on June 18, and Martin took the opportunity to write an article in 
Euzkadi titled “The Influence of Women in Nationalism.”244 At another well-attended 
lecture, Martin could not keep back a smile at the sight of all the Irish flags in the crowd. 
The importance of having a figure with IRA credentials speaking in the Basque Country 
should not be understated. Ambrose Martin, addressing hundreds of young Basque 
nationalists in bustling conference halls on the interconnectedness of their struggle with 
that of the Irish revolutionaries, must have inspired many.245  
 After Martin’s visit, EAB wrote a letter to Cumann na mBan leader Eithne Coyle, in 
French and in Basque, contained in an ornate folder bearing the Irish tricolour and the 
ikurriña—the Basque flag created by the Arana brothers (perhaps, ironically, modelled on 
the Union Jack): 
Ten years ago, the ninth of April 1922, on the occasion of a visit in our 
homeland of an enthusiastic warrior, Ambrose Victor Martin, and with his 
collaboration, which was of great value, the Association of Patriot Women—
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Emakume Abertzale Batza—was founded in the Basque Country, inspired 
by the contemporary example of the Irish women and their glorious 
institution CUMANN NA MBAN [...] In this festival [the anniversary of EAB] 
where the Irish flag was honoured and graced by Irish music choirs, the 
thousands of Basque women moved with emotion dedicated their respects 
and congratulations to the Irish patriot women, and to this honourable 
institution over which you preside so admirably.246 
 
 Martin’s visit in the Basque Country also coincided with two major events in Dublin 
which brought about one of the most substantial instances of contact between Basque 
and Irish nationalists. For the first time, Dublin was home to the annual Eucharistic 
Congress in June 1932, providing the newly-inaugurated de Valera a brilliant publicity 
opportunity to establish his government’s Catholic credentials.247 Preceding it by only a 
few days was the 1932 Tailteann Games—a Gaelic sporting event not unlike the 
Olympics, ‘revived’ from ancient times for the first time in 1924—, where the game of 
handball (or pelota) attracted Basques, who share a mutual love of the sport.248 A handful 
of Basques set off for Dublin on June 19—pelota players Jose Aramendi and Manuel 
Urcelay, Jesuit priest Ramón Laborda, Vice-President of the Pelota Federation of 
Gipuzkoa (and member of the PNV’s executive body in Gipuzkoa) Teodoro Ernandorena, 
and Basque nationalist Aingeru Irigaray. The architect of the operation, Ernandorena, 
stated in an interview that it was a “chance to bring our game of pelota and the problem 
of our nationalism outside of Euzkadi. The occasion could not have been more 
favourable” because “thousands of people from all over Europe” would be there for the 
Eucharistic Congress.249 
 Historian Pere Soler recounts how a ‘delegation’ of the PNV travelled to the games, 
seeing it as a propaganda opportunity.250 However, it seems not to have been an official 
PNV propaganda operation; Ernandorena lamented in an interview with the local press 
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on the day of his departure that the party refused to fund the excursion, and they needed 
to privately fundraise the necessary 3000 pesetas.251 However, this did not stop 
Ernandorena from capitalizing on the opportunity to ‘unofficially’ represent Basque 
nationalism in Ireland. He regularly reported back to the Basque Country on the events 
of their trip, and Euzkadi followed with interest. EAB entrusted Ernandorena with gifts for 
the well-known republican activist Mary MacSwiney (some emakumes would have 
recently heard the lecture on her late brother Terence MacSwiney by Ambrose Martin) 
and Eithne Coyle—an ikurriña and a copy of the book Historia Vasca with a handwritten 
note on the inside: “Taking advantage of the voyage of some of our countrymen to Ireland 
the women of Euzkadi have the pleasure of sending you this little token of esteem for 
your many sacrifices in Erins [sic] cause.”252 Ernandorena’s group was able to deliver the 
gifts personally; Coyle gifted them a collected works of Pearse in return.253  
When they first arrived in Dublin, the Basque delegation was “received solicitously” 
by Garda Commissioner Eoin O’Duffy, members of the press, and their welcoming party 
(associated with the Irish Amateur Handball Association), who greeted them with a cry of 
‘Gora Euzkadi!’254 The head of their welcoming party, Michael Lennon, would prove to be 
a key link during their time in Dublin, because he spoke Spanish (none of the visiting 
Basques spoke English).255  
After the games concluded, the Basques kept busy for a few days. Father Ramón 
Laborda, a seasoned tenor, took the opportunity to give public lectures on Basque music, 
with live performances of his own.256 The group was received as special guests at a Dáil 
session, invited to the Mansion House for a “Ceilidhe under the auspices of Cumann na 
mBan,”257 and permitted to conduct interviews with many key Irish figures, including 
Éamon de Valera. One of the Basques took brief notes on the people they met, providing 
                                               
251 Iñaki, “Una charla del señor Hernandorena,” El Día (Jun. 19, 1932). 
252 Copy of Historia Vasca sent to Eithne Coyle from Emakume Abertzale Batza, UCDA P61/45. 
253 Soler Parício, “Irlanda y la guerra civil española,” 65. 
254 “Los pelotaris guipuzkoanos, en Dublin. Un telegrama del señor Ernandorena,” Euzkadi no. 6081 
(Jun. 22, 1932); Azkoitiko Udala, “Irlanda Euskadi,” 5. 
255 ANV PNV-0219-03. 
256 Camino and Guezala, Juventud y Nacionalismo Vasco, 59; “Congress News Items,” Irish Times (Jun. 
28, 1932); “Ireland and the Basque Countries,” Irish Times (Jun. 27, 1932). 




a fascinating insight on a (moderate) Basque nationalist perspective of some key Irish 
personalities: 
 
Éamon de Valera: “Completely serious and straightforward. He gave us a 
warm welcome. [...] He wanted to know about our [Basque Autonomy] 
Statute” “He asked us some very interested questions” 
 
William T. Cosgrave: “He did not seem very favourable to Basque 
nationalism. He received us very frankly and the interview consisted of him 
making jokes about the convenience of maintaining a strong and unified 
‘Catholic Spain’” 
 
Michael Lennon: “The person who helped us the most. He has been the 
instigator of all the interviews and presentations. He speaks Spanish quite 
well. And he is seemingly agreeable to Basque nationalism. He belongs to 
no party?” 
 
Michael Comyn: “Received us very humbly. He’s from De Valera’s party, 
and was present for the visit” 
 
Patrick Little: “Invited the Basques to a reception at his house (I didn’t go). 
He stayed with us for a while in the Dáil” 
 
Sean Gibbons: “He was the deputy who introduced us in the Dáil, he was 
in the interview with De Valera, he’s from his party” 
 
Sean O’Hanlon: “It was at his mother’s house that the Basques were 
lodged. He’s a republican, but he seems to do fine with the others. [...] He 
was with us in the Dáil, he took us by car to various places” 
 
“These are the people that I met, but Hernandorena and the others were 
presented to many more people, some names as far as I know continue 
down below.” 
 
General O’Duffy: “Chief of the police of the Free State. (They were with him 
several times)” 
    
Miss Mary MacSwiney: “(The sister of the mayor of Cork) She’s one of the 
leaders of the extremist republicans (very catholic)”258 
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Figure 4: Mary MacSwiney, gifts in hand, with the Basque visitors 
Image courtesy of the National Library of Ireland and Independent News and Media 
 
 
It is not clear who the note-taker was. This observer notes that he was not present 
for the meeting with Mary MacSwiney, yet the photo above confirms the presence of those 
Basques already mentioned. There is another Basque name mentioned in passing—“Mr. 
Epalza”—who was present for the special visit to the Irish parliament.259 Based on the 
limited evidence here, (Txomin) Epalza might have been the one to write down these 
notes, though it is unknown why he seems not to have initially arrived with Ernandorena 
and the others. An addendum read: “Make three of copies of these and send this original 
to Mister Francisco [?],” and the scribbled-on flashcards eventually ended up in the 
possession of the Department of External Relations of the PNV’s executive body in 
                                               




Biscay. The notes also included a four-page report focused largely on explaining the 
current relations between Ireland and England in the context of the Economic War.260 
 The reception at the Mansion House stimulated several personal contacts which, 
considering the entanglement of Irish politics with the Basque nationalist cause during the 
Spanish Civil War (discussed in the following chapter), are striking in retrospect. Their 
interactions with key socialist republicans, and with fascist sympathizer Eoin O’Duffy and 
Cardinal MacRory, who would all later have a major stake in the war effort of Basque 
nationalists, raise many questions. Mary MacSwiney, seen photographed with the 
Basque visitors (who privately pointed out her ‘extremism’ and devout Catholicism) would 
go on to support Francisco Franco.261 IRA activist Frank Ryan, who later headed the pro-
Republic volunteer brigade in the Spanish Civil War, told the Basques  
that to the struggle of that nation the sympathy and support of Irish 
Republicans would be extended. If he was to voice the feelings of the 
audience and if he were to ask the foreign visitors to take back a message 
with them, the message would be one from Young Ireland...Militant Young 
Ireland believed that freedom was not something to be negotiated but for a 
God-given right to be asserted.262  
 
However, like the Irish diplomatic effort in Spain in the early 1920s, there was a 
fundamental incongruence between the respective factions within Irish and Basque 
nationalism that were in contact. Laborda and Ernandorena, moderate cultural 
nationalists aligned with the mainstream PNV, must have cringed at the suggestion of 
‘asserting their freedom’ in any sort of revolutionary sense.  
 Ernandorena wrote back to the Basque Country that “our flag has been hugged 
and kissed by the Irish. Many journalists interviewed me. [...] On Saturday I will give a 
conference, and a radio transmission in Basque.”263 And there was indeed considerable 
interest in the Irish press—one reporter stated that  
Dr. Ernandorena was rather enthusiastic that their movement for Home 
Rule was similar to the Sinn Féin movement of Griffith, Pierce [sic], etc., but, 
he added, ‘we aim at getting all we want by peaceful means’. He said that 
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their visit to Ireland was urged by their sympathy and admiration for the 
country and because of the similarity of the political position in the two 
countries. He added that they carried with them a message of good-will to 
the Irish people from the Basques.264  
 
Overall, coverage of the visiting Basques in the Irish press was invariably positive. 
Again, this is especially striking considering events only a few years later. The Irish 
Independent was at this point sympathetic with the Basque nationalists, writing that they 
had cooperated with the Spanish Second Republic when it falsely promised them that 
they would respect religion and take the form of a federal republic.265 Less than five years 
later this same paper would excitedly report: “BILBAO ALMOST ENCIRCLED. SMOKE 
RISES FROM CITY. The victorious Patriots yesterday continued their encirclement of 
Bilbao, the Basque capital.”266 
On their final day in Ireland, the Basque group and their guide, Michael Lennon, 
were featured in a radio broadcast from Dublin, addressing both their Irish hosts and their 
Basque compatriots at home. Lennon gave a message in Spanish and Irish to the Basque 
public, one of the pelota players thanked the Irish public for their hospitality, and 
Ernandorena thanked the fundraisers who made the expedition possible.267 Financial 
difficulties would spell an end for the Tailteann Games after 1932; Basque pelota players 
would not formally face their Irish counterparts again until 2002.268 
 In 1933, Basque nationalist José Maria de Ituarte was visiting Ireland and wrote a 
brief overview of recent political developments, which he sent to the PNV. It is unclear 
whether he was asked by the party to do this, or he took it upon himself. He laboriously 
searched for, and finally located a copy of the 1905 constitution of Sinn Féin to send back 
to the PNV, but it is not clear why any party official would have cared for the outdated 
document. Thanks again to Michael Lennon, he was introduced to various figures in 
Fianna Fáil and Cumann na nGaedheal. He reported: 
The IRA, the group of Miss Mary MacSwiney (the sister of the mayor of 
Cork), and those from ‘An Ciendar’ (I am not sure about the spelling of this 
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word, as it is Gaelic and I am writing it from memory) comprise a group 
calling itself republican (de Valera calls them this too) which they accuse of 
being communist, upon what foundation I do not know. This whole 
republican group, which represents the most fanatical nationalism, is now 
encountering considerable difficulties since various bishops have come out 
against them, accusing them of being illegal and of concomitance with 
communism, and recently in a speech de Valera announced that he would 
not permit the functioning of the IRA because there already exists a regular 
army of the Free State. These republicans are a minority in number and 
youngsters predominate.269 
 
Ituarte noted at the end that most of the people he met “know nothing about Basque 
things beyond hearsay and bad rumours, and many would like to know,” so he asked for 
copies of constitutions and propaganda materials to disseminate amongst contacts 
there.270  
Also in 1933, the PNV was able to solicit a brief statement from de Valera to include 
in a book called El libro de oro de la patria (The Golden Book of the Fatherland). Published 
the following year, its first page featured a portrait of the Irish leader with a quotation 
which read: “With the great sentiments of a patriot. I salute all the Basques and trust that 
they will obtain their liberties.”271 The charismatic new leader of the PNV—Jose Antonio 
Agirre—nearly had the chance to formally interview de Valera in 1935 at the Congrès des 
Nationalités Européennes in Geneva but was ultimately unable to due to a scheduling 
conflict.272 Their relationship with the Irish leader was to remain indirect. 
Escalating Violence in the Basque Country and Ireland 
 
In the background, the further polarization of politics and escalation of violence occurred 
in Ireland and the Basque Country just as they did elsewhere in Europe. September 1932 
marked the most radical incarnation of Basque nationalism yet with the foundation of Jagi-
Jagi (Arise Arise) headed by Eli Gallastegi.273 Its birth was, as historian Eduardo 
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Renobales notes, a symptom of the old, unclosed wounds that had plagued Basque 
nationalism from its earliest years.274 This organization, rooted in the mendigoxale 
tradition, was unapologetically separatist,275 anti-capitalist (explicitly based in the writings 
of Irish republican-socialist and martyr of the 1916 Easter Rising, James Connolly),276 
militant, and positively obsessed with the Irish example. It remained, at least for the first 
two years, technically attached to the PNV, just as Aberri initially had been in 1916. 
However, it categorically refused to work within the Spanish political framework. One 
member wrote: “As Basques, we will not unite with those who carry the epithet ‘Spaniard’, 
because we are not traitors to our homeland. Because we do not cowardly sell our 
ourselves to the enemy that vassalizes us.”277 
Its self-drawn parallel with Connollyite anti-capitalism was hard to ignore—one 
issue featured a quotation from James Connolly twice, once with ‘Ireland’ and ‘Irish’ 
swapped with ‘Basque Country’ and ‘Basque’ beside the original, suggesting that was 
true for Ireland was true for the Basques as well.278 However, it refused to call itself left-
wing, considering Basque nationalism to be a ‘third way’ that transcended the left-right 
dichotomy.279 Furthermore, not only was Jagi-Jagi’s rhetoric towards socialists extremely 
hostile, but its members sporadically fought them in the classic politically-charged brawls 
that bloodied the streets of 1930s Europe.280 Gaizka Fernández claims that they “led 
violent clashes with other youth groups, primarily those of the working-class left,” though 
it would be disingenuous to imply that they were always, or necessarily most often, 
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responsible (determining this would be futile). Its members were sometimes ambushed 
and shot to death by rival socialists.281 
The question of violence as it relates to this organization has serious implications 
for how we consider the ‘Irish influence’ in Basque nationalism. Lorenzo writes that they 
recognized that recourse to force was probably inevitable in order to attain 
independence.282 Watson carefully suggests that, broadly speaking, “the Irish example 
supported and amplified adherence to the potential strategy of violence in the Basque 
nationalist imagination.”283 Fernández observes that “despite having in mind the model of 
radical Irish nationalism, the jagi-jagis did not come to put into practice a strategy of 
terrorism.”284 However, that was neither their goal nor the lesson they derived from the 
radical Irish example (regardless of how one might define the cumbersome label of 
‘terrorism’). 
The attitude of Jagi-Jagi toward ‘struggle’ centred around ‘spiritual struggle’ and 
sacrificial death. The ‘blood sacrifice’ rhetoric took clear influence from Pádraic Pearse at 
times, and they did cite him on occasion, but it partially echoed what Basque nationalists 
had already been espousing from early on. One 1908 article titled “Let us fight!” read: 
“Yes, let us fight, but not the bloody, personal fight, unfitting for a people who feels 
dispossessed of culture; our fight must make itself resound and felt everywhere through 
its transcendence.”285 Gallastegi frequently couched these notions in the language of 
combat and bellicose metaphors, but his preparedness for actual violence is less than 
certain: “In this battle of ideals, of clean hands; this battle of conduct, of exemplarity, and 
maintaining all sense of proportion, we have advanced like so [...] Now we are in the new 
trench on the front!”286 Regarding their next advance, a fellow member of Jagi-Jagi wrote:  
We do not proclaim violence, since it does not fit the spirit of Jagi-Jagi, no, 
we preach civil disobedience and personal SACRIFICE [...] We will win the 
second trench cleanly, like our very good collaborator ‘Gudari’ said of the 
first in these same pages—all of us sacrificing ourselves, all of us, rich and 
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poor, women and men, and we will have made a great advance in our 
fight.287 
 
Gallastegi’s loyal follower, Txanka, who had been perhaps the first radical Basque 
nationalist to contact the Irish government back in 1921, and had translated some works 
of Pearse into Spanish,288 addressed the question of violence explicitly in an ideological 
synopsis of Jagi-Jagi: 
We believe in the force of truth and not the force of force. This can triumph 
sporadically, but ultimately it fails. The force of truth, however, suffers 
defeats periodically, but its inevitable end must be victory [...] The enemy 
will always defeat us by force, for it holds the reins of power, but through 
sacrifice we will inflict upon it the most humiliating defeat.289 
 
This language was strikingly similar to that of their much-admired hunger striker Terence 
MacSwiney, who famously said: “It is not those who can inflict the most but those that can 
suffer the most who will conquer.”290 
 However, such rhetoric did not necessarily entail that an insurrection like the 
Easter Rising was an altogether unwelcome outcome. Jagi-Jagi emphasized that thanks 
to James Connolly, Tom Clarke, and Pádraic Pearse, the Rising was a ‘triumph of the 
spirit’ and not of ‘brute force’.291 When other articles prominently featured quotations such 
as “THE HISTORY OF PEOPLES WHO WIN LIBERTY IS ALWAYS WRITTEN IN 
BLOOD,”292 it raises the question of whether they genuinely believed they could bleed 
without drawing blood. Evidently, in the context of the street violence, the killings, and 
persecution at the hands of the state, some members of this marginal group had a hard 
time holding back. One anonymous member wrote, in an article titled “Politics with Blood,” 
that  
if there is any blame in all this, in no way does it belong to us. Because 
Basque nationalism, which could have formed groups of determined and 
brave youths to wipe out the murderers [...] preferred to recommend calm 
and restraint to the Basque patriots, believing that our enemies would agree 
to a noble and human fight, that demands all probity. But now you see that 
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for some people, as for some animals, everything from words to threats turn 
out to be sterile. And there is no remedy other than to resort to the whip, 
which is, for us idealist men, something we have always condemned.293 
 
In that same issue, another article titled “Basque youths: Do not kill!,” implored: “Contain 
yourselves mendigoxales, all youths who fight for the cause, contain your impulses.”294  
 This subtext demonstrates the danger in taking some Jagi-Jagi rhetoric at face 
value as though they were pacifists. As Núñez notes, “the cult of sacrifice implicitly led to 
the necessity of violence.”295 Whether Gallastegi and his followers recognized this, and 
simply hid their ulterior motives is debatable. However, their weapons training exercises 
in the mountains must have brought more to mind than only their own deaths.296 After all, 
the heroes of the Easter Rising, who were covered extensively in Jagi-Jagi,297 would likely 
not have been killed or executed in a peaceful protest. James Connolly, executed for his 
role in the Rising and well-studied by Jagi-Jagi, perhaps spoke to the radical Basque 
nationalists with his reflections on violence in 1899: 
We neither exalt [physical force] into a principle nor repudiate it as 
something not to be thought of. Our position towards it is that the use or 
non-use of force for the realization of ideas of progress always has been 
and always will be determined by the attitude, not of the party of progress, 
but of the governing class opposed to that party.298 
 
 In Ireland, the gulf between the fringes of the left and the right had been steadily 
growing since the twilight years of Cosgrave’s Cumann na nGaedheal government in the 
early 1930s. In 1925, the IRA split from the political authority of Sinn Féin. Historian Donal 
Ó Drisceoil identifies four broad tendencies within the IRA at this time: revolutionary 
socialism, apolitical militarism, social conservatism, and a middle group of pragmatists.299 
The socialist republican faction was headed by anti-Treatyite veterans such as Frank 
Ryan, Peadar O’Donnell, and George Gilmore, and these leftist members of the IRA grew 
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increasingly frustrated by the predominance of the ‘apolitical militarists’ in the 
organization. In 1931, O’Donnell helped establish Saor Éire (Free Ireland), a socialist 
offshoot of the IRA. Internal documentation from the group fell into the hands of the 
Commissioner of the Garda Síochána (the police force of the Irish Free State), pro-Treaty 
IRA veteran General Eoin O’Duffy, who saw Saor Éire as proof that the IRA had become 
a communist organization (in reality, most of the IRA was not committed to a socialist 
revolution).300 O’Duffy was a principal force behind the red scare that swept Ireland in the 
1930s, and demanded that the authorities take immediate action against the IRA.301 Both 
Church and state, as represented respectively by Primate of All Ireland Joseph MacRory 
and leader of the Irish Free State William T. Cosgrave, came out strongly against what 
they saw as a plot to introduce Soviet communism into Ireland.302 Saor Éire, along with 
the IRA and Cumann na mBan, was declared an illegal organization shortly thereafter, 
which would be undone by de Valera after his electoral victory in 1932.303 
 The zealous O’Duffy began to prepare a coup that would install a military 
dictatorship in the event of a Fianna Fáil election win—a party seen by many Treatyites 
as the puppet of a vengeful IRA.304 Of course, this never came close to materializing, and 
in 1933 de Valera dismissed O’Duffy from his post of ten years as Garda 
Commissioner.305 His dismissal arrived at a moment when the Army Comrades 
Association—a veterans’ organization comprising many pro-Treaty IRA veterans hostile 
to their civil war foes from the anti-Treaty IRA—sought new leadership.306 O’Duffy 
assumed control, and under his leadership it was renamed the National Guard, though 
came to be more commonly known as the Blueshirts, for its standardized uniforms 
reminiscent of European fascist movements.307  
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 In September 1933, Cosgrave’s Cumann na nGaedheal, Eoin O’Duffy’s Blueshirts, 
and the short-lived National Centre Party united to form a new political party: Fine Gael 
(Family of the Gaels), briefly led by O’Duffy himself.308 Meanwhile, the Blueshirts and the 
IRA were at each other’s throats. During O’Duffy’s tenure as leader of the Blueshirts, large 
groups would brawl with IRA contingents until they were pulled apart by the police.309 The 
leftist republicans, with their frequent cry of ‘no free speech for traitors!’, also sought out 
physical confrontations with their rivals, who they understandably saw as fascists.310 
However, O’Duffy’s reign as Fine Gael leader ended with his resignation a year later, and 
he then subsequently left the Blueshirts.311 
 It was a time for rebranding for both ends of the political spectrum in Ireland. 
O’Donnell, Ryan, and Gilmore founded a new political organization in 1934, the 
Republican Congress, after abandoning the IRA.312 With unbridled optimism, this socialist 
splinter group saw itself as having “stirred the moribund Republican movement into 
life.”313 General Eoin O’Duffy formed the “openly fascist” National Corporate Party.314 
Basque Nationalism, Spanish Politics, and the Spectre of War 
  
Around this time in the Spanish Basque Country, the PNV still eagerly awaited a statute 
of autonomy. The 1933 statute which had received majority support in the three provinces 
never passed in the Spanish parliament, ostensibly due to the high abstention in Araba. 
Faced with a critical election in 1936, the PNV remained unaligned with either the liberal-
left Popular Front or the “counterrevolutionary electoral alliance” of the right.315 Despite 
its natural affinity with the political right, and the surprisingly heavy-handed persecution 
of Basque nationalism by the Spanish Second Republic, the PNV chose not to join the 
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broad right-wing coalition because the Popular Front government finally guaranteed them 
an autonomy statute.316 Moreover, the self-proclaimed and virulently ‘anti-separatist’ right 
was hardly a comfortable bedfellow.317 
 The 1936 election returned a slim victory for the Popular Front in the Spanish 
parliament, and the PNV won in Biscay and Gipuzkoa, but not Araba.318 The PNV then 
moved ahead with a two-province autonomy statute. As rumours of a country-wide 
rebellion abounded, some members of the PNV entertained the overtures of the rightist 
conspirators.319 In July 1936, when the rebellion against the Spanish Second Republic 
orchestrated by Brigadier General Emilio Mola commenced, the PNV branches in Araba 
and Navarre implored the central party leadership to go along with the so-called ‘Rising’ 
(a small irony considering the connotations of the word in modern Irish history).320 
 Eli Gallastegi, the hibernophile extraordinaire, advocated neutrality. Contrary to 
what his pen name would suggest, Gudari (Warrior) wanted the mendigoxales, who had 
been trained for years as a sort of paramilitary army, to assert their Basqueness by 
abstaining from what he saw as a Spanish affair.321 When not writing, he made a decent 
living with a few business ventures, one of which was an import-export business by the 
name of Euzkerin (a portmanteau of Euzkadi and Erin) that traded with Ireland, which he 
sought to aid in its economic war with Great Britain.322 On the other side of this venture 
was the rehabilitated Ambrose Martin, whose Irish-Iberian Trading Company had been 
granted lucrative trade licences by the Fianna Fáil government. He perhaps also 
benefited from the appointment of his close contact and associate of de Valera, Leopold 
Kerney, as ambassador to Spain in 1935.323 Thanks to the efforts of Gallastegi and Martin, 
amidst all the chaos in the streets of 1930s Bilbao, one could at least enjoy a pint of 
Guinness.324 
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Civil Wars, 1936-1939 
 
 
“Whether there is to be a centralised government or whether there are to be several 
independent states in the peninsula—Basque, Catalonian, Castilian—is not a concern 
of Irishmen.” 
Liam de Róiste, 1936325 
 
“We invite them all to come to our country, to Euzkadi, to see what kind of Catholics we 
are. To see what we have done for God. To see the Holy Cross of our Saviour in our 
public schools. As we are a bit sick of diplomacy.” 
 
Euzko Deya, 1936326 
A Basque Civil War 
 
The Spanish Civil War is well known for its international dimension, yet a number of other 
internal conflicts were played out within it. The in-fighting between Anarchists and 
Communists behind Catalan lines famously described by George Orwell in Homage to 
Catalonia is perhaps the most famous example. Several historians also point to a ‘Basque 
civil war’ between the Carlists and the Euzko Gudarostea (Basque Army), the forces 
commanded by the Basque government in Biscay and Gipuzkoa. Leading up to the 
rebellion, the Spanish government, wary of the loyalty of some of its own military officers, 
had dispersed notable suspect officers in the farthest reaches of the country. The future 
dictator of the country, Francisco Franco, for example, was sent to the Canary Islands. 
However, they made the grave error of sending the mastermind of the military conspiracy 
against the government, Emilio Mola, to Pamplona, Navarre.327 Far from being a 
quarantine, the Navarrese capital was the heart and soul of the most dedicated 
counterrevolutionaries, the Carlists. 
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 Ever since the revolutionary fervour that shook Spain in 1934 (notably the Asturian 
miners’ strike, which left some 3000 dead), Carlists had become increasingly militant, 
advocating for a pre-emptive first strike against the left.328 They recalled the great guerrilla 
tactician of the Basque front in the First Carlist War who had died a century earlier—
Tomás Zumalacárregui—“he was our hero and is a national figure [...] Requetés! Let us 
not forget the red of our beret.”329 Ironically, Basque nationalists also co-opted this 
Gipuzkoan commander, interpreting the First Carlist War as a manifestation of Basque 
nationalism.330 The Carlist militia, known as the ‘Requeté’, began seriously arming itself 
in 1935 with the help of its wealthiest associates and the fascist Italian government.331 
Blinkhorn claims that on the eve of the rebellion, the Requeté, by nature a “rurally based, 
genuine citizen army,” was “probably the most numerous paramilitary body on the 
Spanish right.”332  
By the time of the Spanish Civil War, these staunchly traditionalist monarchists had 
already been something of an anachronism for a while; one Irish observer referred to the 
Carlists as “strange and outmoded survivors of an age that seemed remote.”333 
Nonetheless, they were willing and able allies of the military conspirators—comprised of 
fascists (from the Falange), Catholic nationalists, and other monarchists—as they 
planned to overthrow the Spanish Second Republic. The Carlists imagined this war as 
the Fourth Carlist War, though this time Bilbao was not the same liberal stronghold that 
had resisted Zumalacárregui in 1835. Now it was firmly in the hands of the PNV-led 
Basque government. With Basque nationalists in Biscay and Gipuzkoa having thrown in 
their lot with the Republic, they faced an imminent danger from the Carlists on their 
doorstep (and indeed, within their own territory). The Popular Front government appealed 
to the Basque nationalists to “fight to the death the Carlists who wish to destroy all your 
liberties.”334  
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At the beginning of August 1936, an army comprised mostly of Requetés advanced 
into southern and eastern Gipuzkoa from Navarre. By early September, they definitively 
held the eastern part of the province, cutting off access by land to France.335 Behind the 
lines, members of the PNV in Navarre and Araba were mostly spared from the thousands 
of executions carried out by the Carlists.336 The red-capped monarchists were 
unflinchingly hostile to separatism, and had no desire to join the forthcoming ‘Republic of 
Euzkadi’, but harboured far more hatred for leftists than for Basque nationalists.  
Not only can historians call this a Basque civil war in retrospect, but it was 
understood as such at the time. One mendigoxale from Bilbao remarked: “It was absurd, 
tragic—we had more in common with the Carlists who were attacking us than with the 
people we suddenly found ourselves in alliance with.”337 The PNV explicitly called the 
Navarrese Carlists fratricidal, and asked how they could bring themselves to kill their 
brothers when only a few years earlier they had proudly called themselves Basques.338 
Indeed, it was only four years before the war that Navarre had nearly signed an autonomy 
statute alongside the other three Spanish Basque provinces. 
The Basque Dimension of the ‘Irish Brigade’ in Spain 
 
Behind the scenes, a clique of right-wing Spaniards in London was busily mobilizing 
international support for the rebellion. This network included the old Spanish ambassador 
to Britain, Alfonso Merry del Val y Zulueta,339 who later published Spanish Basques and 
Separatism, a short book meant to reveal the nefarious truth about Basque nationalism 
to the British and Irish public. Many people had been fooled by them, he wrote, for “[t]he 
Basque Separatist is nothing if not a master of propaganda in its latest form as taught in 
the schools of Moscow.”340 An associate of Merry del Val, Carlist nobleman Count 
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Ramírez de Arellano, was in touch with Emilio Mola as he planned the uprising. For 
reasons “imperfectly clear,” Arellano contacted Irish Cardinal Joseph MacRory, who then 
put him in touch with General Eoin O’Duffy.341 An under-the-table arrangement resulted 
in the leader of Ireland’s National Corporate Party to begin recruiting for an ‘Irish Brigade’ 
to go fight in Spain.342 Fearghal McGarry explains that beneath the rhetoric of defending 
the Church against the ‘reds’, this was a clear opportunity for “political rehabilitation” for 
the humiliated O’Duffy, recently fired by de Valera from his longstanding position as 
Garda Commissioner and then deposed as Fine Gael leader.343 
There has been considerable historical debate surrounding Eoin O’Duffy’s political 
inclinations. His penchant for the “liturgical aspects of fascism (the uniforms, salutes, 
parades, and mass rallies),”344 his apologism of Hitler and Mussolini, his zealous 
nationalism, anti-communism, and emphasis on national virility, and his own corporatist 
political outlook, all point to fascism. Historians generally agree that during his prominent 
role in Fine Gael and subsequent leadership of the Blueshirts, his personal fascistic 
politics were reigned in by the more politically respectable conservative elements within 
these groups. By leaving the Blueshirts to form the National Corporate Party, O’Duffy is 
seen as having “follow[ed] his instincts towards undisguised fascism.”345 
However, the interesting point about Eoin O’Duffy’s intervention in the Spanish 
Civil War is that it was at the behest of Navarrese Carlists rather than a genuinely fascist 
organization—with which he might have shared more in common at least superficially— 
such as the Falange led by Jefe José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the late dictator 
Miguel Primo de Rivera.346 O’Duffy, however, was deeply moved by the intense religious 
devotion of the traditionalist monarchists. He was brought to Pamplona in September 
1936 to formalize the arrangements for his volunteer corps. The proud General O’Duffy 
was warmly welcomed by Navarrese provincial officials and members of the Carlist High 
Command, who gifted him an iconic red beret, and accompanied him at a celebratory 
                                               
341 Robert Stradling, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939: Crusades in Conflict (Manchester: 
Mandolin, 1999), 7. 
342 Ibid. 
343 McGarry, Eoin O’Duffy, 286. 
344 Ibid., 244. 
345 Ibid., 269; Cronin, “The Blueshirt Movement, 1932-5,” 318-319. 
346 To be precise, the organization was from 1934 to 1937 called the Falange Española de las Juntas de 




mass at the cathedral.347 Stradling recounts how O’Duffy met the primate of Spain, 
Cardinal Isidro Gomá, from whom “he received his first instruction concerning the 
Basques and the paradoxical nature of their resistance to the [Spanish] nationalist 
movement.”348 However, while O’Duffy’s understanding of the intricacies of Spanish 
politics is often deprecated, he certainly already had some familiarity with Basque 
nationalism going back at least to his interactions with Ernandorena’s group in 1932.  
What is most interesting is how O’Duffy dealt with the fact that he found himself 
near the front of a war between Basques. After all, he did not hesitate to refer to Navarre 
as the Basque Country.349 On September 24, General Francisco Franco, who had rapidly 
risen to become the face of the rebellion, approved the terms of agreement for O’Duffy’s 
Irish Brigade. In his own account, O’Duffy cites Clause Six of the agreement: “The Irish 
Brigade may be employed on any front with the sole exception of the Basque front. 
General O’Duffy objects to the Irish troops being engaged against the Basque Nationalists 
for reasons of religion and traditional ties between the Basques and the Irish.”350 
However, O’Duffy must only have been recalling it from memory, because the original 
document, on file at the National Library of Ireland, reads: “General O’Duffy points out 
that it would be preferable not to oppose the Irish to the Basque Nationalists, who are 
Catholics. With this sole exception, they may be employed on any other Front.”351 While 
the original carries a slightly less forceful tone, it also never said anything about ‘traditional 
ties’ with the Basques; perhaps O’Duffy intentionally omitted such a reference so as to 
downplay his affinity with them?  
More importantly, what was his conception of these ‘traditional ties’? Potentially, a 
vague notion of such a thing was communicated in the sympathetic chats between the 
Basques and the Irish in the Mansion House in 1932. Perhaps O’Duffy knew of historic 
Basque-Irish ties from elsewhere. Such references popped up sporadically during his 
lifetime. As mentioned in the Introduction, there is evidence of a popular understanding 
of an ancient Basque-Irish relationship. One 1925 article in the Irish Times called the 
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Basques “one of Ireland’s pre-historic settlers.”352 A 1937 article noted as though it were 
obvious that the “tie of sympathy between Ireland and the Basque Country, it is hardly 
necessary to point out, is of no recent forging.”353 Whatever the case may be, O’Duffy 
initially refused to fight against the Basque nationalists, though he claims to have later 
asked Franco to revoke this clause (it seems unlikely that this was ever formally done, 
and the Irish Brigade ultimately never saw combat against the Basque Nationalists).354 
As O’Duffy waited for his volunteers to arrive (of which he expected several 
thousand), he was able to tour the rebel-held parts of the Basque Country, remarking in 
his journal on November 30 that he stopped in the capital of Araba, “Vittoria” (Gasteiz), 
and the recently-captured capital of Gipuzkoa, San Sebastián (Donostia) en route to 
Saint-Jean-de-Luz (Donibane Lohizune)—presumably to meet with Leopold Kerney, who 
carried out diplomatic activities in this French Basque town until the end of the war.355 By 
this point, the only part of the Basque Country not held by the rebels was Biscay and a 
small portion of western Gipuzkoa. 
The Irish Republican Left and the Basque Nationalists 
 
Eoin O’Duffy was not the only Irishman who found himself in the Basque Country upon 
the outbreak of the civil war. The Republican Congress, “virtually defunct,” was revitalized 
by the Spanish Civil War.356 It was now faced with the impossible task of convincing the 
Irish public at large to support the Spanish Second Republic, against the strong red scare 
current.357 As McGarry observes, the Irish perception of the Spanish Civil War was 
inextricably entangled with politics at home, “still poisoned by the legacy of its own civil 
war.”358 The Republic-aligned and profoundly Catholic Basque Country presented an 
obvious counterargument to the pervasive view that the war was one “between the forces 
                                               
352 “Ireland in the Argentine,” Irish Times (May 29, 1925). 
353 “Ireland and Basque Children,” Irish Independent (Jun. 4, 1937). 
354 O’Duffy, Crusade in Spain, 199. 
355 Eoin O’Duffy, Diary: Irish Brigade in Spain, NLI MS 48, 292/2; Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 65-66. 
356 Hanley, “Fighting the Fascists,” 25. 
357 Ó Drisceoil, “The ‘Irregular and Bolshie Situation’,” 56. 
358 Fearghal McGarry, “Ireland and the Spanish Civil War, in Spanish-Irish Relations Through the Ages: 





of God and the forces of anti-Christ.”359 Republican Congress co-founder George Gilmore 
was therefore sent to Biscay to search for a Basque Catholic who had made a good 
impression in Ireland four years earlier—Father Ramón Laborda. 
Gilmore flew to Bilbao in August 1936, but poor weather caused the plane to crash-
land. He escaped with only a broken leg, though required a stay in the hospital.360 
Afterwards, Gilmore met Lehendakari (President) Jose Antonio Agirre in his presidential 
office, where the young PNV leader relayed to him news of rebel atrocities in occupied 
areas of the Basque Country, even furnishing him with a list to bring back to Ireland. 
Gilmore reported: “I was entertained by President Aguirre and members of his United 
Front Government. A crucifix occupies the most prominent place in his office. He is 
intensely Nationalist, but is Catholic as well. Priests and nuns walk about the streets of 
Bilbao, as they have always done.”361 While the PNV might have had little sympathy, 
ideologically speaking, for Gilmore’s Republican Congress, they recognized the value of 
their position as the “‘only argument’ that there was any tolerance in the Republican zone 
toward Catholics.”362 
Agirre was unable to help Gilmore locate Laborda, but recommended he search in 
Bayonne (Baiona), just across the border, where many had sought refuge from the war 
(before the capture of eastern Gipuzkoa complicated this route).363 Gilmore, perhaps still 
limping, made it to the French Basque Country where he found Laborda, who agreed to 
come to Ireland in early 1937.  
The Debate in Ireland on the Spanish Civil War and the Basques 
 
Back in Ireland, an intense propaganda battle raged between rival supporters of the two 
sides in the Spanish Civil War. Behind the Francoist rebels was the full weight of the Irish 
Independent, a new organization called the Irish Christian Front, and prominent 
                                               
359 Which, according to TD (Independent) Richard Anthony, was the view held by “the majority of 
professing Christians in Ireland.” See Dáil Debates 65 no. 5, Speech 239 (Feb. 19, 1937), 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1937-02-19/12. 
360 Soler Parício, “Irlanda y la guerra civil española,” 511. 
361 “Basque priest exposes ‘Independent’ lies,” The Worker (Nov. 21, 1936). 
362 Payne, Basque Nationalism, 180. 




outspoken Catholic clergymen, who all found a receptive audience in the Irish public. The 
Irish Independent had long been a pro-Treaty and rabidly anti-communist paper, which 
the Basque nationalist visitors of 1932 recognized as being aligned with Cosgrave.364 Its 
influence was significant considering it was “the most widely-circulated daily in the 
country.”365 Stradling also suggests that the chairman of the Irish Independent, William 
Lombard Murphy, and its editor Frank Geary, had a hand in covertly financing O’Duffy’s 
Irish Brigade.366 The Irish Christian Front was an anti-communist activist organization 
born in 1936 led by Fine Gael TD, ex-Blueshirt, and vitriolic anti-Semite Patrick Belton, 
who unsuccessfully pressured the government to officially recognize the government of 
Caudillo Francisco Franco.367 
Belton travelled to Spain in November 1936, where he extensively surveyed rebel-
held territory.  He did not oppose Eoin O’Duffy’s venture but advised enthusiasts of the 
cause that their efforts were better spent in Ireland generating support for Franco and 
securing the recognition of his government.368 Volunteers were not necessary, he argued, 
because Franco’s victory was guaranteed. Belton personally met with General Franco, 
who gave him a message to relay to the people of Ireland:  
As a Spaniard, but more particularly as a Galician and a Celt, ties of racial 
ancestry bind me to Ireland, not only by a common ethnical origin, but also 
by characteristic qualities of temperament and imagination. The gesture of 
Irish Catholics in helping, with such splendid self-sacrifice, the work of 
national salvation which all good [S]paniards have imposed upon 
themselves as the most sacred of their duties, and the cordial sympathy 
with which, since the commencement of the war, the Irish people have 
shown to us, warrant our everlasting gratitude.369 
 
Franco’s appeal as a ‘fellow Celt’ worked wonders on Belton, who compared the 
Generalísimo to a leader of a different ‘Rising’—Pádraic Pearse.370  
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In Ireland, tense debates raged in the Dáil over de Valera’s policy of non-
intervention. Patrick Belton lambasted the leader of the government, calling Fianna Fáil 
a ‘red’ party and demanding: “We have got to say whether we stand for Christ or anti-
Christ. That is the issue, nothing else.”371 From the other side of the political spectrum, 
he was decried as a traitor and a supporter of the fascists in Spain.372 De Valera astutely 
announced: 
I am anxious that we should play our part in trying to shorten this conflict in 
Spain by preventing the export of arms to the combatants and also by 
preventing recruitment for the various sides who are fighting out in Spain, a 
fight which, for most of them, at any rate, is not the sort of fight that we think 
it is, but is a fight for one "ism" against another.373 
 
This line of thought was supported by the Irish Times, which was critical of both the 
government and the rebels; nonetheless, it often found itself defending the Republic, 
stressing its legal legitimacy.374  
In early November, just before Gilmore’s return to Ireland, the Republican 
Congress organized anti-Franco events around Dublin, now focused on the Basque 
nationalists.375 A crowded meeting on November 5 presided over by veteran IRA leader 
Ernie O’Malley also featured Father Michael O’Flanagan, Peadar O’Donnell, and 
Ambrose Martin (whose relation to the Republican Congress is unclear).376 Martin read 
aloud a statement from the head of the PNV’s propaganda apparatus, Juan Ajuriagerra, 
who thanked “the intention and works of this meeting in Ireland to make known the real 
cause for which Euzkadi stands, and we see with emotion the sympathy of Republican 
Ireland for us.” George Gilmore also sent a message from Bilbao read by Martin: “Basque 
people, fighting for national liberty against Fascist invasion, expect sympathy of 
Republican Ireland. Territory held by Basque government peaceful and like normal. 
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Bilbao has 60,000 refugees from Fascist terror in San Sebastian.” The meeting closed 
with a message to the PNV:  
Republicans assembled in Dublin preparing to launch campaign to make 
known the truth of your struggle. Repudiate Irish Christian Front and new 
Fascist bodies, who have misrepresented Irish sentiment. Received your 
message with enthusiasm and send cordial greetings.377 
 
 An article in the Irish Independent the next day attacked the Republican Congress. 
Editor Frank Geary wrote that Peadar O’Donnell and his ilk “insulted the name of decent 
Irish republicanism by their vile suggestion that Irish republicans have any sympathy with 
the murderers of priests and the destroyers of churches.”378 O’Donnell later referred to 
Geary as the ‘penman-in-chief-to-Fascism’.379 
 Ramón Laborda arrived in Dublin in January, giving his first lecture at a crowded 
theatre in Dublin. Unable to speak English, a translation of his speech was read by 
Ambrose Martin. It challenged the red scare, holy war narrative on several different levels. 
Basque nationalists, simply by virtue of being opposed to Franco, were not communists, 
Laborda insisted. He covered the religious angle by telling how Francoist rebels carried 
out extrajudicial executions of Basque priests in captured territory, and how several of the 
leaders of the military coup were themselves not even religious. As for the claims that the 
Spanish Republican government was Communist, only 15 of 475 seats in Parliament 
were held by Communists, he explained.380 “When I read recently that the Catholics of 
Ireland were offering men and money to Fascist Franco—the personification of the most 
brutal imperialism, I exclaimed: It is impossible. Ireland could not do that unless she has 
been miserably deceived.”381 For a Basque nationalist who had been exposed to frequent 
exaltations of Ireland and so warmly received in 1932, such news must have been 
disappointing. 
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 The Dublin conference spawned a heated exchange in the press via letters to the 
editor between Laborda and an Irish priest, Father Philip Gannon. “No one ever accused 
the Basques of the countryside of being Communists,” Gannon wrote, but “through 
exaggerated local patriotism, they have forgotten the larger interests of the Kingdom of 
God in their attachment to their petty Fueros.”382 He charged them with “an insane and 
criminal act” for having extended “a friendly hand to Communism on the battlefield, and, 
above all, on Spain and on the Christian soil of Biscay and Navarre.”383 Of course, as 
discussed, ‘friendly’ would be a mischaracterization of the uneasy relationship between 
the PNV and the Popular Front government, but the finer points of politics escaped Father 
Gannon. He concluded: 
Hence, however much we admire and like the little ethnic group which has 
maintained itself since pre-history in its picturesque surroundings, we 
cannot lend them our sympathy as long as they are united in arms with their 
present allies. Our sense of proportion forces us to set all Spain before a 
part and the cause of Christ before the Fueros even of Father Laborda’s 
romantic highlands.384 
 
Laborda responded, drawing a parallel between Ireland and the Basque Country to 
highlight Gannon’s hypocrisy: “Father Gannon will excuse me if I do not take him seriously 
as a judge of the Catholic people and priests of Euzkadi. But Basque nationalists readily 
admit their opposition to the unity of Spain, which is to us as the unity of the British Empire 
is to Irish Republicans.”385 Furthermore, he again asserted that the Irish people had been 
misled, and some of them had been recruited by Fascists “to join Franco in a war on our 
small nation.”386 However, it might have been more accurate, and painful to admit, that 
they had been recruited by Navarrese Carlists rather than Fascists. 
 Laborda continued to give speeches in Dublin, accompanied by socialist 
republicans and veteran of Basque-Irish affairs, Ambrose Martin. He and Martin sought 
to demonstrate the similarity of the Basque and Irish struggles for independence. Laborda 
concluded one overview of the conflict with: “This is something of what is happening in 
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the Basque country, whose history shows so many close parallels with Irish history, and 
which is now fighting as Ireland has done for its freedom from an alien race. Let us hope 
for the happiness of both in their longed-for liberty. Amen.”387 Martin appealed to 
audiences with exaggerated stories of how Basque nationalists “helped the Irish people 
in their struggle for liberty.”388 
Laborda and his entourage travelled to Belfast to speak at Queen’s University. The 
first lecture, presided over by Victor Halley of the Socialist Party of Northern Ireland, did 
not go well.389 Speakers were interrupted by cries from the audience of “Up Franco!” and 
“What about the murder of nuns?”390 Some thirty police officers at the event physically 
ejected the furious hecklers, but O’Donnell and Laborda were banned from speaking 
again at the university.391 As Seán Cronin notes, “it was difficult to put the case against 
Franco in any part of Ireland in the spring of 1937.”392  
Laborda’s visit to Ireland ultimately had little tangible effect on Irish public opinion. 
Laborda expressed his disappointment and was evidently frustrated by the difficulty of 
making the case for the Basque government in a country he expected would readily 
understand. He called the Irish clergy “partisans of Fascism,”393 and probably cared little 
for the politics of his far-left acolytes. Apparently, however, his visit generated enough 
controversy to warrant a response from O’Duffy, with a Basque-Irish parallel of his own: 
That the Basques—Catholics for the most part—allied themselves with the 
avowed destroyers of their religion and all the traditions held most sacred 
by them, has caused much confused thinking in Ireland and has been 
seized as a weapon to use against the Nationalist cause. It has been said 
that the Basques are as much entitled to complete independence from 
Spain as the Irish are to independence from England. But there is no 
similarity. The Basques are no more entitled to partition from Spain than six 
counties of Ulster are to partition from Ireland. Their claim is equally 
absurd.394 
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De Valera and his cabinet followed news of rebel persecution of the Basques with 
interest and were well aware that the Spanish Civil War was not a battle between 
Crusaders and forces of the Antichrist.395 Moreover, de Valera was of course familiar with 
Basque nationalism, and had already expressed his sympathy in the past. However, 
Laborda’s presence in Ireland made his administration uncomfortable in light of its neutral 
stance. Due to a diplomatic oversight and dishonesty on Laborda’s part, his visa 
application for entry into Ireland, ostensibly for the purpose of “giving lectures on Basque 
music,” was approved. The embassy that issued the visa was chastised, as Laborda’s 
activities “caused embarrassment to the Government,” and they noted “it may be 
necessary to request him to leave Saorstat Eireann.”396 
Overall, the socialist republican concentration on the ‘Republic of Euzkadi’ was 
tactically wise, even if mostly ineffective. The plight of the irrefutably Catholic Basque 
nationalists demonstrated that the war in Spain was not as straightforward as the pro-
Franco forces within Ireland sought to portray it. However, their primary aim was not to 
generate support for the Basque nationalist war effort, but for that of the Republic more 
broadly. It was ironic then that the example they thought would resonate most with the 
Irish public was the Republic’s least enthusiastic ally. Their coverage of this front was 
disingenuous in two ways. First, Irish socialist republicans ignored the conservative 
character of mainstream Basque nationalism and the fact that the PNV had run in an 
electoral alliance with the political right against their current allies only a few years earlier. 
For the purpose of their propaganda it befitted them to not report that the PNV waged an 
internal war against radical leftist elements in its own territory which included dissident 
socialist militiamen and anarcho-syndicalists, who vandalized and burned down some 
churches and carried out extrajudicial executions.397 Second, the so-called ‘Basque oasis’ 
which they used to cast doubt on the reports of atrocities in Spain was exceptionally stable 
socio-politically, thus making any extrapolations suspect.398 For instance, one audience 
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member asked Ambrose Martin to talk about “the Catholic element in Madrid and other 
parts of Spain,” to which he replied “that it was difficult for him to deal with anything that 
was happening outside the Basque Country.”399 To be sure, Franco supporters overstated 
and misrepresented atrocities behind Republican lines, but anticlerical violence was still 
common, even if it was not institutionally sanctioned. Historian Paul Preston notes that 
over 30% of monks in Republican territory were killed, and that “[c]hurches and convents 
were sacked and burned everywhere in the Republican zone except the Basque 
Country.”400 
Volunteering in the Basque Country 
  
There is conflicting evidence regarding a plan to send volunteers to fight in the Euzko 
Gudarostea. Historians Santiago De Pablo and Ludger Mees claim that “elements of the 
IRA,” including “military leaders” were prepared to aid or fight for the Basque 
government.401 The story told by the contemporary press indicates otherwise. After 
Ramón Laborda’s first speech, the Republican Congress sent a telegram to the Basque 
government, signed by Peadar O’Donnell: “Great assembly in Gaiety Theatre, Dublin, 
presided by Father O'Flanagan, Ramón Laborda heard with enormous enthusiasm. I 
send greetings and promise propaganda.”402 
The Basque government acknowledged the receipt of a telegram “from the 
President of the Republican Congress, offering help to the Government of Euzkadi.”403 
However, the Republican Congress felt the need to clarify its intent: 
It was learned in Dublin last night, says the Press Association, that the message—
apparently referred to by the Council of Defence at Bilbao as an offer of 
assistance—was a congratulatory one only. It was sent from the meeting on 
Sunday last, at which a priest from the Basque Government, Father Laborda, gave 
a lecture, says the Agency. A telegram of goodwill was signed by Mr. Peadar 
O’Donnell, as Chairman, merely for credential purposes. His signature, it was 
stated last night, had no other significance.404 
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According to Cronin, George Gilmore returned with word that “the Basques apparently 
did not need fighting men.”405 
 Further complicating this question is the fact that one Irishman did in fact fight in 
the Euzko Gudarostea. A young Dubliner, Jack Prendergast, was the only Irishman to 
fight alongside the Basque nationalists.406 Upon the outbreak of the war, Prendergast, 
having some knowledge of the Basques, travelled on his own accord to the Basque 
delegation in London to volunteer to fight.407 He emphasized to the Irish press that he had 
fought in the Basque army—not the International Brigades—“until the last inch of Basque 
territory had been taken.”408 He received training in the Basque Country and then fought 
in an anti-tank mortar and artillery battalion under the command of the PNV, rising to the 
rank of captain.409 When captured in 1937, the Irish embassy feared he would be 
executed, but Leopold Kerney successfully intervened to secure his release.410 
 However, the claim of de Pablo and Mees seems to be based on internal 
documents of the Basque government. In November 1936, a Basque politician based in 
Paris wrote a memorandum to the government in Bilbao after the visit of two Irish 
republicans, Peadar O’Donnell and the other unknown. The message encouraged the 
government to send an official delegate to the Republican Congress pro-Basque rally, at 
which Ambrose Martin would ultimately present himself as their delegate. Most 
interestingly, O’Donnell apparently discussed aid in the form of espionage and military 
volunteers from the IRA for the Basque government.411 Soler rightfully notes that this was 
“more rhetorical than real.”412 
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 There was further Basque-Irish correspondence in 1938 between Michael Lennon, 
the kind host of the Basque visitors in 1932, and Txomin Epalza, the aforementioned PNV 
member who probably penned the notes on that same visit to Dublin. Lennon advised 
him that Lehendakari Agirre should personally reach out to de Valera and arrange for 
official Basque diplomatic representation in Ireland. With the note came attached a brief 
message of unknown authorship which read: 
Person in Ireland well-regarded by [Basque] Nationalist Party declares that 
a pro-Basque council has been founded which is prepared to work on 
anything it is asked. It can carry out a great deal of work on propaganda, 
[obtaining] foodstuffs, money, etc. The Irish market is one of the principal 
suppliers of cattle, eggs, and potatoes in England. Elements of the IRA (Irish 
Republican Army) and Fianna Fail (de Valera party) await with interest and 
anxiety precise and concrete instructions to begin working on whatever they 
are sent. This could also include sending military leaders.413 
 
With all of this evidence considered, we can ask—how serious was the prospect 
of Irish aid for the Basque government? If the Basque government was willing to let the 
lone Jack Prendergast serve, why did the other offers of aid never materialize? And why 
did the Basque government rely on Ambrose Martin to represent them rather than an 
actual party official?  
First, the Basque government was actively seeking British support throughout the 
war, and perhaps calculated that intimate ties with Irish republicans would damage their 
more important relationship with Britain. Second, as has been already indicated, the PNV 
deeply distrusted radical leftist elements at home. One British official observed: “The 
Basques, I have the impression, fear more ‘Red’ aggression from Santander and Asturias 
than the danger from the Military. To prevent infiltration of undesirable elements from the 
West they have instituted a rigorous control of their Santander frontier.”414 It is therefore 
conceivable that they might have had reservations about importing militant socialist 
republicans from Ireland, whereas a single, politically unaffiliated Irishman might have 
been permitted. 
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Some Irishmen, however, did travel to Spain to fight for the Republic—about 150 
volunteers headed by Frank Ryan did so.415 It was in no small part a counteraction against 
the mobilization of the pro-Franco Irish Brigade: “It is also a reply to the intervention of 
Irish Fascism in the war against the Spanish republic which, if unchallenged would remain 
a disgrace on our people,” declared Frank Ryan.416 However, they were significantly 
outnumbered by Eoin O’Duffy’s 700-strong force (somewhat short of his original promise 
of 5000!).417 On one occasion, the two expeditions nearly encountered each other in 
combat outside of Madrid.418 Still poisoned by the legacy of civil war politics, “for some 
the Spanish Civil War must have been pre-eminently a war within the Irish Republican 
Army,” writes Hugh Thomas.419 
Eoin O’Duffy’s troops served alongside the Carlists for much of their short-lived 
crusade, which came to an inglorious end in the Spring of 1937 as the rebels renewed 
their siege of Biscay. One volunteer recounted how their Navarrese comrades “were the 
finest soldiers anyone could meet, and treated the members of the Brigade as brothers 
[...] Carlist troops did duty in the front line during the day, and members of the Irish Brigade 
relieved them at night.”420 They admired the Carlists so much that some officers sought 
to formally integrate the Irish Brigade, then in the Spanish Foreign Legion, with the 
Requeté.421 Some of the men returned home with red Carlist berets—a Basque 
souvenir—which they might have worn instead of their forage caps issued by Nazi 
Germany.422 
The Irish Perception of the Basque Nationalist War Effort 
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According to McGarry, enthusiasm for Franco in Ireland did not truly begin to wane until 
the bombing of Gernika.423 This small Basque town, incinerated by the German Luftwaffe, 
was the first in history to be totally destroyed by aerial bombardment, and quickly became 
an icon of the Spanish Civil War.424 The reasoning behind the infamous attack has been 
much debated by historians. The choice to use incendiary bombs, to strike on the weekly 
market day when the civilian population swelled, and above all to target Gernika, the 
symbolic heart of Basque nationalism, indicate to many that it was an attack intended to 
maximize civilian casualties and demoralize the besieged Basque nationalists as 
Franco’s forces prepared for the final push into Bilbao.425 
The reaction in the Irish media was predictable. The Irish Independent first 
reported that it was not bombarded, but if it was, hypothetically, it would have been 
justifiable because it was a legitimate military target. The true culprits, it argued, were 
Russian-ordered arsonists.426 It later promoted the claim that it was a false flag attack 
perpetrated by the Basque government, who destroyed the town with dynamite.427 The 
Irish Press (founded by Éamon de Valera in 1931 and reflecting the Fianna Fáil party 
line), quoting journalists who witnessed the event first-hand, reported that German 
bombers had killed over 800 civilians in “the most appalling air raid in the history of 
modern warfare.”428 The Irish Times stated: 
After the events of the last few weeks in Northern Spain it has become 
exceedingly difficult to maintain the thesis that General Franco is fighting a 
holy war. The destruction of Guernica has horrified the world. This town 
was the ancient capital of the Basques, hallowed by a thousand years of 
national and religious memories, and it was wiped out of existence in a 
few hours by the most ruthless air raid in the history of warfare.429 
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Once again, the Basques occupied a key position in Ireland’s awareness of the 
Spanish Civil War. As Bilbao fell to the rebels, tens of thousands of refugees poured out 
of the city under the protection of the British Navy. Some 4000 Basque children were 
brought to England, while Ireland “did not feel it had the Basques on its conscience.”430 
Among these refugees were the wife and five children of Eli Gallastegi.431  
Gallastegi fled Bilbao a week before its capture by the Francoists.432 He left for 
Paris, and from there applied for a visa to enter Ireland, vouched for by his old friend 
Ambrose Martin.433 The trading operation run by Gallastegi and Martin continued until the 
fall of Bilbao, however, Martin’s Irish-Iberian Trading Company had been unable to send 
money to the city since the outbreak of the war. Gallastegi thus had a considerable sum 
of money waiting for him to collect in Dublin.434 He and his family moved to Gibbstown (or 
Baile Ghib), a small Gaeltacht (a legally-recognized primarily Irish-speaking district) in 
County Meath where Martin owned land.435 Their large home became something of an 
informal Basque museum, where Irish visitors could learn about Basque culture and 
history.436 His children all became fluent Irish speakers, and the exiled Gudari lived in 
Ireland for the next 21 years.437 
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Figure 5: Ambrose Martin (left) with Eli Gallastegi (right) and his children in Gibbstown 
Image courtesy of Barra McFeely 
  
Throughout the war, even after their defeat, the Basque government maintained a 
strong presence abroad. From London and Paris, it published Euzko Deya (Basque Cry), 
a biweekly publication with many articles aimed explicitly at the Irish public. Among its 




Gudarostea to assist with Basque propaganda.438 Euzko Deya was also sent to the Irish 
embassy in France, which wrote: 
I have been receiving regularly every week for several months past, a 
periodical entitled “EUZKO-DEYA” which is a Basque nationalist 
propaganda sheet published and distributed in Paris. Copies have been 
sent to me without request or payment and I assume that copies are being 
sent in the same way to all Diplomatic Missions etc. etc. in Paris and in 
France.439 
 
Its very first issue on November 29, 1936 featured a lengthy article in English titled: 
“From the basques [sic] of Euzkadi to the Catholics of Ireland.” It reported on Francoist 
executions of Basque priests and addressed the Irish public: “As Basque Nationalists, as 
defenders of God in democracy and liberty, we want the world to know of such crimes. 
We once more appeal to the Catholics of the world, and to you,—most specially—, Irish 
patriot, as there exists some similarity between you and us.”440 It also directly addressed 
Eoin O’Duffy: “Never mix up politics and religion. And never allow anybody to do so. Do 
you hear us, O’Duffy? [...] Beware O’Duffy!! Mind your steps, Christian Front!! You had 
better learn enough [about] our problems before making politics.”441 Many issues followed 
the events of Laborda’s tour in Ireland, ultimately remarking that the “Basque and Catholic 
propagandist had to leave Ireland, leaving sensible people with the conviction that his 
people were right, and leaving right-wing circles a bad memory.”442 Like Laborda, the 
frustration of the writers of Euzko Deya was palpable: “To tell the truth, there is nobody 
more painfully experienced than an Irishman to talk about civil wars, and nobody who 
seems better disposed than an Irish Catholic to understand the Basque Catholics. But 
Father Gannon says not a word about all that.”443 
 A journalist from the Irish Times interviewed Jose Ignacio Lizaso, the PNV 
delegate in London, who told him: 
Oh! Ireland! Ireland! What a disappointment you have been to the Basque 
people! We have watched your struggle for liberty. We have followed your 
people with our heartfelt sympathy and love. Our hearts were raised at your 
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victories, and we believed that the spirit of freedom had spread through your 
land. Had we been asked what country in the whole world we might depend 
on for sympathy and understanding, I should have at once placed Ireland 
as the first who would give us courage and hope. And then comes the news 
that an Irish regiment has arrived to fight against us.444 
 
This sentiment was echoed by the Vice-President of the Basque government in exile, 
Manuel Irujo, many years later: 
Ireland has been for us [...] a nation that defrauded us. Us Basques were 
sincere admirers of the Irish. We followed with respect, and even 
admiration, their fight for national liberty. We were sincerely happy every 
time that the people of Ireland triumphantly advanced a step on the path to 
its demands. Like a great number of Basques, the Irish people were 
nationalist and fervently Catholic. That admiration lasted until our war. It 
seemed that the Irish would therefore effortlessly understand the Basque 
situation. That was not the case. Ireland was one of the first countries to 
offer assistance to our enemies, sending a Legion to fight in its ranks [...] 
Earlier, in international conferences, Ireland was one of the most reluctant 
countries in recognizing the justice of the cause of democracy in Spain.445 
 
Indeed, for Manuel Irujo it was especially difficult to understand why Irish solidarity with 
Basque nationalism was not more pronounced. On a later occasion, he wrote a short 
essay on Basque-Irish parallels, claiming that there were “obvious coincidences, 
pronounced in the parallelism of the current situation of the religious, social, and political 
order.”446 
 The Basque disappointment in Ireland highlights the naïveté of the assumption that 
the Irish people saw the same affinity with the Basques as vice versa. Most sympathy 
with the Basque national cause was overridden by the distaste for the Spanish Second 
Republic, and most Irish people did not understand the complexities of the Basque 
nationalist alliance with the Popular Front. Basque nationalist propaganda sought to make 
their small nation more relatable by drawing parallels with Ireland and portraying their 
cause as ‘fighting for freedom’ just as the Irish had done against the British. However, it 
took the destruction of their historic cultural capital to have any notable effect on Irish 
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public opinion. De Valera, while probably sympathetic, could not see the Basque cause 
as sufficient reason to alter his stance of neutrality. 
The Basques’ most ready allies were socialist republicans, but their sympathy did 
not extend to any serious consideration of material aid. This is a further example of the 
incongruence that sometimes characterized the interaction of Basque and Irish 
nationalists—the most developed relationship in this case was between the moderate 
Christian democrat PNV and the fringe leftist element of Irish republicanism. Moreover, it 
is interesting to consider that some Basque nationalists had personally met soon-to-be 
Fine Gael leader William T. Cosgrave in 1932, who they noted as “a friend of the 
Spaniards” after an uncomfortable interview with him. Their positive interactions with Eoin 
O’Duffy around that same time might go some way in explaining his initial refusal to fight 
on the Basque front four years later. The good impression that Father Ramón Laborda 
made at this time proved significant a few years later when George Gilmore trekked 
through the Basque Country to find him. 
There is an irony in Ireland’s relation to the Spanish Civil War in that O’Duffy was 
seduced by Carlists in Navarre while his bitter socialist rivals at home focused heavily on 
the Basque nationalists. The old civil war rivalry in Ireland found itself embroiled in what 
could be seen as a civil war in the Basque Country. As evidenced by the comments of 
two PNV officials, however, the Irish Brigade made more of an impact than did the 
Republican Congress on the Basque memory of their relationship with Ireland during the 
Spanish Civil War. Nonetheless, this episode would be forgotten by the next generation 

















EPILOGUE: “The Failure of the Last Generation” 
 
 
From practically the outset of the Spanish Civil War, the Basque government developed 
crucial contacts in British political circles.447 In August 1936, two Basque nationalists 
arrived at the British embassy in Paris to float the idea of “British protection for a 
hypothetical Basque government.”448 In 1938, Luis Arana wrote a letter to the British 
government, proposing 
that England in close collaboration with France, [...] should protect the formation 
and once formed become the protectors of two States to be established between 
the Pyrenees and the River Ebro. One of those political States or Republics should 
be Basque, under the denomination of Euzkadi and enjoy the effective protectorate 
of England. The other one should be a Latin Catalan-Aragonese State and 
protected by France.449 
 
Luis Arana’s brother Sabino had predicted, 36 years earlier, that the “independence of 
the Basque Country, under the protection of England, will be a happy fact in the not-too-
distant future.” It seems that for some, that dream had never died. 
 The defeated Basque government-in-exile remained hopeful that a Basque state 
could still be established. The Second World War was seen as such an opportunity, with 
the expectation that the Allies would topple the Franco regime. Jose Ignacio Lizaso wrote 
to the British Foreign Office in September 1939 that “the Basque Government are anxious 
to assist Great Britain and France in every way possible in their fight for a free Europe.”450 
Such sentiment lies in stark difference to his comments on Ireland. Overall, British officials 
were fond of the Basque nationalists: “Speaking generally, the Basques are the most 
reliable of the Spanish citizens, and the leaders of their delegation, both here and in 
France, are well-known to me, and I regard them as completely trustworthy. Their whole 
political outlook is very similar to our own,” wrote one of their contacts.451 
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 Ironically, while Luis Arana was campaigning for British protectorate status for the 
Basque Country, Ireland was distancing itself from Britain as much as possible. On the 
eve of the Second World War (in which Ireland remained neutral), Éamon de Valera 
drafted a new constitution to replace that of the Irish Free State. Following a referendum, 
it was passed in July 1937. The position of Governor-General was replaced by a 
Presidency, and Taoiseach (Chief) was the new title for the President of the Executive 
Council. The Irish state was to be referred to simply as Ireland, or ‘Éire’, which de jure 
consisted “of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas”—an irredentist 
claim that it would not relinquish until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.452 
 The PNV remained enamoured with Britain even after the Second World War. 
When Ireland unilaterally declared itself a Republic in 1949, Basque Vice-President 
Xabier Landaburu—who earlier lamented that Ireland had ‘defrauded’ the Basques—
remarked that the Commonwealth proved itself “a patent example of respect for 
democracy.”453 Other PNV officials, including Lehendakari Agirre, were based in New 
York, where they hoped to convince the Americans to overthrow the dictatorship of 
Francisco Franco. Historian Ludger Mees remarks that the “unrealistic, even blind 
confidence in ‘American friends’, who were eventually supposed to pay in return for the 
Basques’ support during the war, over the years turned out to be a strategic dead end.”454 
Their efforts, while noble, returned nothing. In 1951, in the context of the Cold War, 
the United States sided with the unquestionably anti-communist Franco regime.455 A new 
generation of Basque nationalists, frustrated with the failures of their forefathers, became 
more receptive to violence. While the moderate nationalists of the PNV continued to laud 
Britain, radical Basque nationalists again made contact with some of its most avowed 
enemies. In 1960, four young Basque PNV dissenters received guerrilla training in Ireland 
from the IRA, then in the midst of its unsuccessful Border Campaign (1956-1962). One of 
them was Iker Gallastegi, whose father Gudari organized this historic and deeply symbolic 
                                               
452 Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937), Article 2; This article was amended as part of the terms of the Good 
Friday Agreement. 
453 Xabier Landaburu, “La lección de la Commonwealth,” Alderdi no. 26 (May 1949), 17. 
454 Ludger Mees, “Transnational Nationalism: The Basque Exile in Barcelona-Paris-New York (1936-
1946),” in The International Legacy of Lehendakari Jose A. Agirre’s Government, 177. 
455 Joseba Zulaika, That Old Bilbao Moon: The Passion and Resurrection of a City (Reno: University of 




meeting, thanks to his contacts with important figures in the nationalist movements in both 
Ireland and the Basque Country.456 The cleft between moderate and radical within 
Basque nationalism was yet again reflected in their respective appeals to Britain or 
Ireland. 
Eli Gallastegi himself remained in Ireland, where he had friends in high places,457 
until 1958. His old friend, the mysterious Ambrose Martin, was badly injured after being 
hit by a car in Dublin, not far from the office of his Irish-Iberian Trading Company. Martin 
left Ireland in 1939 to stay at his impressive chateau on the coast of Brittany—one of the 
several properties he purchased in the late 1930s—ostensibly to recover from his injuries. 
For reasons uncertain, Martin was unable to return to Spain, and personal matters kept 
him away from Ireland for several years. He spent the duration of the Second World War 
in Nazi-occupied France, in his seaside fortress not far from Quimper. Locals from the 
area recount that many Basques fleeing the Franco dictatorship found refuge in the 
chateau.458 Both Ambrose Martin and Eli Gallastegi passed away in 1974. 
In 1961, the exiled Basque government in Paris invited Iker Gallastegi and a few 
of his comrades to a conference to discuss their grievances with the PNV. Iker Gallastegi 
argued that only through armed struggle could the Basque Country be made free, given 
the political context. To the audience of PNV politicians, whom he saw as passive, 
ineffective relics of a past generation, the young Gallastegi said: “War is a terrible thing, 
but it is not an evil thing.”459 The organizer of the conference, Manuel Irujo, denounced 
the turn to ‘useless violence’ with a quotation from Éamon de Valera, and responded in 
the official journal of the PNV: “Only the fascists say that war ‘is not an evil thing’.“460 But 
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in fact, unknown to Irujo, it was a quotation from 1915, from none other than Pádraic 
Pearse, whose words found resonance in the Basque Country in 1916, and again in 
1961—“War is a terrible thing, but war is not an evil thing. It is the things that make war 
necessary that are evil. [...] When war comes to Ireland, she must welcome it as she 
would welcome the Angel of God. And she will.”461 
Other Basque nationalists did indeed welcome war. A small student group known 
as Ekin (Act), founded in 1952, renamed itself Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA—Basque 
Country and Freedom) in 1959. It was at least in some part the ‘failure of the last 
generation’, to quote Pearse, that gave rise to ETA. Over the next five decades, this 
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Overall, the relationship between the Basque and Irish nationalist movements from 1895 
to 1939 is by no means one of ‘natural solidarity’ nor is it easily characterizable by any 
other monolithic label. The internal dynamics of Basque and Irish politics which shaped 
their understanding of each other were sometimes prejudicial to sympathy and solidarity. 
Basque-Irish relations in this period were marked by numerous contradictions and ironies. 
A concerned British diplomat remarked in the early 1920s that many in Spain “believe[d] 
that the Irish question [was] fundamentally a religious question,” which worked in favour 
of the Sinn Féin propagandists.462 It was a similarly simplistic understanding of the 
Spanish Civil War in Ireland that worked against the Basque nationalist efforts to garner 
sympathy there. 
 On the other hand, there were moments of genuine solidarity. Many young 
Basques were captivated by the 1916 Easter Rising and would go on to play prominent 
roles in Basque nationalist politics. The Rising was discussed, studied, and 
commemorated by Basque nationalists for decades to follow. Basque nationalists 
sporadically went to Ireland over the years, in pilgrimage-like visits, returning with high 
praise. Some Irish nationalists found the Basque Country alluring as well. Jack 
Prendergast left his life in Dublin behind to join a PNV battalion in the Euzko Gudarostea 
and helped Basque propagandists in Paris produce articles for the Irish public. Michael 
Lennon—veteran of the Rising, and a scholar of Spain—welcomed the visiting group of 
Basque nationalists in 1932, and remained in contact with the PNV for several years later, 
hoping for an official Basque embassy in Ireland.  
The vibrant Eli Gallastegi propagated the ideals and lessons of Irish republicanism 
in his speeches, in Por la libertad vasca, and in journals such as Aberri and Jagi-Jagi. 
Gallastegi set up the trading company Euzkerin to aid Ireland during the Economic War 
with Britain after Éamon de Valera came to power, importing Irish eggs and livestock (and 
stout). His fascination with Ireland culminated in his emigration to Gibbstown, where he 
raised a family of multilingual Basque and Irish-speakers.  
                                               





On the other end of Euzkerin’s trading operation was Ambrose Martin’s Irish-
Iberian Trading Company, the very existence of which was probably owed to his close 
personal relationship with de Valera and other figures such as Leopold Kerney, then 
serving as the Irish Minister Plenipotentiary to Spain. Martin was remembered as a 
foundational figure in the Basque nationalist women’s group, Emakume Abertzale Batza. 
He also joined mendigoxales in the Basque hills, probably teaching them guerrilla tactics. 
How did a young, small-town Irish-Argentinian come to be so familiar with the Basques? 
The interaction of the Basque and Irish diasporas (in Argentina or elsewhere) is an 
avenue for further research. The details of Martin’s exposure to Basque culture in 
Suipacha and/or the surrounding area are uncertain, but I would offer a potential 
connection: One of Martin’s closest Basque associates was Tomas Anabeitia, whom he 
regarded as “a great personal friend.”463 Anabeitia was the manager of Euzkerin in Bilbao, 
and visited Martin in Ireland on many occasions. In 1936, Anabeitia married a young 
Irishwoman, Teresa Ryan. Ambrose Martin was the best man at the wedding, and hosted 
the reception at his home in Dundrum.464 A Garda intelligence investigation of Martin in 
1940 indicated that Anabeitia “left hurriedly for Argentine [sic] about the time the Martins 
left Dundrum. Himself and Martin parted on extremely bad terms although they must have 
been intimate friends for a long time—probably in Argentine [sic] and Spain before coming 
to Ireland.”465 Did the friendship of Anabeitia and Martin begin in Argentina, before 
Martin’s first trip to Bilbao, ‘to visit old friends’ as he said, in 1922? Whatever the case 
may be, we can be certain that Irish and Basque people settled in same communities 
throughout the province of Buenos Aires in the nineteenth century, and they evidently 
took an interest in each other. 
The parallels drawn between Basque and Irish nationalists indicate how they saw 
each other, how they saw themselves, and how observers continue to view the 
relationship between the two nations. For example, ‘Ulster’ as a concept could be 
Navarre, it could be “spread throughout the Basque Country,” and it could be the Basque 
Country itself, depending on the observer. Pádraic Pearse was variously idolized, 
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dismissed as a ‘demented fool’, likened to Sabino Arana,466 compared to Francisco 
Franco, and invoked by ETA years later. Ireland and the Basque Country did not present 
static, objective facts to be understood, but malleable ideas. Many commentators have 
pointed to the ‘Irish mirror’ in which Basque nationalists saw themselves reflected. Núñez 
draws attention to the multi-faceted nature of the Irish example; nationalists of most 
inclinations could find an analogue in Ireland.467 Many Irish nationalists of different stripes 
likewise saw their reflections in Spain. The Republican Congress was naturally drawn to 
the ambitious, left-wing Spanish Second Republic, while others such as Eoin O’Duffy 
found a role model in the counter-revolutionary and deeply religious Carlists in Navarre. 
General O’Duffy perhaps saw too much in common with the Basque nationalists, inspiring 
his refusal to deploy the Irish Brigade against them.  
We see a diversity of Basque-Irish nationalist links in this era, some more clear 
than others. The early Sinn Féin propagandists in Spain were in touch with the more 
conservative tendency within Basque nationalism, the CNV, with whom they supplied 
news for articles in the most widely-read Basque nationalist paper of the day, Euzkadi. 
Eli Gallastegi and his fellow aberriano radicals had contact with some Sinn Féin members 
close to Éamon de Valera himself: Ambrose Martin, Leopold Kerney, and Laurence 
Ginnell, for example. While de Valera never had a serious interest in formal relations with 
Basque nationalists, he was sympathetic and had at least a passing interest in their 
cause.   
The good impression made by the visiting group of Basque nationalists in Dublin 
in 1932 bore fruit in 1936 when George Gilmore was sent to Bilbao to find Catholic priest 
Ramón Laborda and bring him back to Ireland. Unfortunately for Laborda, the plight of 
Basque nationalists was unpalatable and not readily comprehensible to the devoutly 
Catholic Irish public, who associated the Spanish Second Republic and its allies with 
burnt churches and murdered nuns. Laborda left disappointed and brought back stories 
that made the rounds in the Basque nationalist press, shocking those who expected the 
sympathy of a nation supposedly so similar.  
                                               
466 “Basque nationalism,” Irish Press (Jun. 24, 1932). 




 One of the fundamental questions that has inspired many analyses of the Basque-
Irish relationship concerns the reverberations of the Irish example in Basque nationalism. 
What were the lessons that Basque nationalists derived from events in Ireland? And how 
did these affect the trajectory of their movement? While Sabino Arana did espouse 
sacrificial death for the homeland,468 the dramatic Easter Rising provided a more potent 
example, as did the idealism of the uncompromising anti-Treaty republicans. Irish 
republicanism’s well-developed politics of martyrdom strengthened the convictions of 
radical Basque nationalists. The Rising demonstrated to Basque nationalists the 
importance of spiritual victory. Against all odds, and even in loss, they could ultimately 
win. Yet as Gallastegi saw, factionalism within a nationalist movement could culminate in 
civil war. With this prophecy on the minds of Gallastegi and his followers, their mild 
autonomist rivals were not merely political opponents but their future oppressors and 
murderers. We cannot be certain of the impact of Gallastegi’s writings, though Jagi-Jagi, 
in which he contributed frequently, had an impressive weekly circulation of at least 
22,000.469 According to Jagi-Jagi, his book Por la libertad vasca was an unprecedented 
success in all of Basque literature, and the publisher was barely able to meet demand.470 
Certainly, thousands if not tens of thousands of Basque nationalists were reading his 
laudatory accounts of events in Ireland and the explicit Irish parallels he drew with the 
Basque cause. 
 Ireland was, above all, a success in the eyes of Basque nationalists in this era. 
While falling short of an all-Ireland republic, Irish nationalists had achieved far more than 
their Basque counterparts did, who only received a two-province autonomy statute in a 
desperate offer from a government which would effectively cease to exist within three 
years. Nonetheless, Ireland was not their only point of reference. In time, Ireland became 
the most prominent role model, but Basque nationalists still discussed nationalist 
movements in Poland, India, Cuba, Ethiopia, Austria, and other nations. However, the 
teachings of the Irish Revolution naturally appealed more to radicals. While progressive 
Basque nationalists found justification in the legalist Catalan example to participate in the 
                                               
468 Sabino Arana, “Martires de la Patria,” Baserritarra no. 4 (1897) in Sabino Arana, Obras escogidas. 
Antología política (San Sebastián: L. Haranburu, 1978), 121. 
469 Lorenzo Espinosa, Gudari, 160. 




Spanish political process, their radical counterparts found justification in revolutionary 
Ireland to abstain. Given the manifest success of the Irish model, its appeal is easy to 
understand. 
 However, the radical Basque nationalists were markedly different in their hesitance 
to use violence, or at least to officially endorse it. While “the physical force ethic” was one 
of the major ideological features of Irish republicanism,471 it was not openly received in 
the Basque Country. Nonetheless, it was part and parcel of the means by which radical 
Basque nationalists hoped to attain independence. When the followers of Jagi-Jagi saw 
an opportunity for a rising of their own in the Spanish Civil War, they tried in vain to 
convince their countrymen to turn the conflict into a war of national liberation.472 But in the 
Basque Country, constitutional nationalism proved to be more durable than it had been 
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